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Article 
Contraceptive Comstockery: Reasoning from 
Immorality to Illness in the Twenty-First Century 
PRISCILLA J. SMITH 
This Article examines the use by anti-contraception advocates of the claims that 
“contraception harms women” and “contraception is abortion,” claims made most prominently 
in litigation challenging Obamacare’s contraceptive coverage requirement. See Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). The Article uncovers the nineteenth-century roots of these 
arguments and the strategic reasoning behind their current revival, to reveal that these claims 
are part of a broad attack on contraception grounded in opposition to non-procreative sex.  In 
Part II, the Article reviews nineteenth-century reasoning about contraceptives, and then in Part 
III, discusses the modern revival of this Comstock era mode of reasoning about contraception 
which connected immorality and illness. Today, however, considerable social acceptance of sex 
for pleasure (at least for some people in some circumstances) means that straightforward 
arguments against contraception based on its immorality do not resonate as successfully as they 
once did. Social conservatives have publicly acknowledged as much, expressing an anxiety about 
the position of religion as “belief” rather than “truth,” and about a rise in what they call 
“sexualityism.” As a result, modern opponents of contraception have intentionally attempted to 
mask outmoded and unpopular moral opposition to non-procreative sex by using scientific 
discourse, citing the best science “we can currently lay our hands on,” for support.  
The problem for anti-contraception advocates, as revealed in Parts IV and V, is that the 
appeal to science is a purely rhetorical move, and their claims are contradicted by the latest 
scientific evidence.  The Article establishes the safety and benefits of hormonal contraceptives to 
women’s and children’s health. The Article also shows that the claim that five hormonal 
contraceptives are abortifacients is false.  Four out of five do not interfere with implantation of a 
fertilized egg and so cannot be said to terminate a “pregnancy,” even as redefined by opponents 
as occurring upon fertilization.  Opposition to these hormonal contraceptives is thus not truly 
based on the view that destruction of a fertilized egg is immoral and should be considered an 
abortion.  Rather, the opposition goes much deeper, stemming from a general objection to all 
forms of contraception and the ability of women to have sex without accepting the possibility of 
pregnancy and motherhood.  The Article concludes in Part VI with evidence of the benefits of 
increased access to the most effective forms of contraception. 
Anti-contraception advocates are deploying woman-protective health arguments to limit 
access to contraception using a strategy similar to that adopted to oppose abortion. Anti-
contraception advocates have melded these arguments to contemporary anxieties about 
heterosexual women’s ability to survive on equal footing with men in today’s sexual and marital 
“marketplace” in order to stymie efforts to expand contraceptive access and to further restrict 
access where possible.  
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Contraceptive Comstockery: Reasoning from 
Immorality to Illness in the Twenty-First Century 
PRISCILLA J. SMITH 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article interrogates two critiques of hormonal contraceptives to 
reveal that both critiques are animated by moral arguments against all non-
procreative sex dressed up in faulty scientific reasoning. The two 
arguments are: (1) that contraceptives are bad for women’s health, and (2) 
that many hormonal contraceptives are actually abortifacients that 
terminate pregnancy because, it is argued, they could prevent a fertilized 
egg from implanting into a woman’s uterine lining. These claims circulated 
in anticipation of challenges to the contraceptive coverage requirement in 
the Affordable Care Act1 and were submitted before the Supreme Court in 
the Hobby Lobby2 litigation in the form of an amicus brief filed on behalf 
of a group called “Women Speak for Themselves.”3 Although these claims 
garnered significant attention recently during the Hobby Lobby litigation, 
in fact, the claims that contraceptives are bad for health and are morally 
equivalent to abortion have a long pedigree.   
In fact, the modern claims that “contraception harms women” and 
“contraception is abortion” are modes of reasoning consciously modeled 
                                                                                                                          
 Associate Research Scholar in Law, Yale Law School; Senior Fellow and Director, Program for 
the Study of Reproductive Justice, Information Society Project, Yale Law School. For their helpful 
comments and suggestions, I thank Colin Agur, BJ Ard, Jack Balkin, Logan Beirne, Valerie Belair-
Gagnon, Nick Frisch, Lauren Henry, Kate Klonick, Jonathan Manes, Gabriel Michael, Kerry Monroe, 
Melissa Murray, Doug NeJaime, Sofia Ranchordas, Esteve Sanz, Amanda Shanor, Reva Siegel, and 
Andrew Tutt. For excellent research assistance, special thanks are due to Liz Dervan.  Thanks are also 
due to the editors of this journal, especially Brendan Gooley, for outstanding editorial guidance which 
greatly improved the Article.   
1 See Helen M. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest:  The “Birth Control” Mandate and Religious 
Freedom, 58 VILL. L. REV. 379, 379 (2013) (arguing that the Affordable Care Act has challenged the 
understanding of free exercise of religion as a human right). 
2 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
3 Brief for Women Speak for Themselves as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12–13, 
Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 1536 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356) (claiming that “[t]hese 
covered prescription drugs are specifically those that are designed to prevent implantation . . . . [W]hen 
an embryo cannot implant in the mother’s womb, it perishes.” (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis 
in original)). The argument was presented in that brief in support of the doctrinal claim that the 
government did not have a compelling interest in requiring contraceptive coverage and so could not 
defeat the plaintiffs’ claim that the contraceptive coverage requirement violated the plaintiffs’ right to 
free exercise of religion under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Id. at 1–2. 
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on the claims of nineteenth century anti-contraception crusaders. These 
Comstock crusaders believed that illicit sexual acts, including non-
procreative sex facilitated by contraception, were immoral and this 
immorality was the cause of illness and harm to women. These beliefs 
undergirded the federal Comstock Act, which banned the distribution of 
contraception and information regarding contraception, as well as state-
level mini-Comstock laws in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  
Today, however, considerable social acceptance of sex for pleasure (at 
least for some people in some circumstances) means that straightforward 
arguments against contraception based on its immorality do not resonate as 
successfully as they once did.  Anti-contraceptive advocates can no longer 
rely on the tacit agreement that contraception leads to illicit sex, loose 
women, and over-stimulated young men. Social conservatives have 
publicly acknowledged as much, expressing an anxiety about the position 
of religion as “belief” rather than “truth,” and about a rise in what they call 
“sexualityism.”4 As a result, in reviving the message of their nineteenth 
century counterparts, modern opponents of contraception consciously 
chose to deemphasize moral arguments in favor of claims that 
contraception is bad for women’s health, relying on scientific claims that 
fall apart upon examination.5   
 Anti-contraception advocates are deploying woman-protective health 
arguments similar to the woman-protective reasoning adopted to oppose 
abortion6 when fetal-protective arguments failed to result in rejection of 
Roe v. Wade.7. Anti-contraception advocates have melded these arguments 
                                                                                                                          
4 See infra Part III. 
5 Importantly, these claims are styled as defensive claims against government overreach designed 
to appeal to libertarians, anti-vaxxers, and other government skeptics along with social conservatives.  
See, e.g., Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (discussing the plaintiffs’ claim that the federal government’s 
contraception coverage requirement infringes religious liberty).  
6 See Brenda Major et al., Report of the APA Task Force on Mental Health and Abortion, AM. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N 6 (2009), http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/abortion/mental-health.pdf 
(noting that evidence indicates that the relative risk of mental health problems due to an abortion is 
similar to the risk associated with an unplanned pregnancy, but that risk increases in certain 
circumstances). Despite extensive evidence that abortion does not increase suicide attempts or ideation 
overall, see id., anti-abortion advocates have had some success in using claims of such harm to regulate 
abortion. See Planned Parenthood Minnesota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 904 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(“[A]lthough the record reflects ‘medical and scientific uncertainty,’ as to whether abortion itself is a 
causal factor in the observed correlation between abortion and suicide, there is nothing in the record to 
suggest that abortion as a cause per se has been ruled out with certainty. As a result, the disclosure of 
the observed correlation as an ‘increased risk’ is not unconstitutionally misleading or irrelevant under 
Casey and Gonzales.” (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007)) (citation omitted)). 
7 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming 
central principles of Roe); Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons:  Constitutional Conflict and the 
Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1643 (2008) [hereinafter The 
Right’s Reasons] (“Instead, . . . [t]he supporters of [one state’s abortion] ban . . . speak in gentle tones 
 
 2015] CONTRACEPTIVE COMSTOCKERY 975 
to contemporary anxieties about heterosexual women’s ability to survive 
on equal footing with men in today’s sexual and marital “marketplace”8 in 
order to stymie efforts to expand contraceptive access and to further 
restrict access where possible.9  
The modes of reasoning that have undergirded efforts to regulate 
women’s reproductive rights have not escaped attention.  In 1992, Reva 
Siegel observed that the Supreme Court reasoned “about reproductive 
regulation in physiological paradigms . . . obscur[ing] the possibility that 
such regulation may be animated by constitutionally illicit judgments about 
women.”10 By relying on “natural,” physiological differences between the 
sexes to regulate reproduction, the Court “deflect[ed] attention from the 
social context in which judgments about protecting unborn life are formed 
and enforced.”11  
More recently, Siegel traced the emergence of woman-protective anti-
abortion discourse, documenting the spread of a new form of reasoning 
about abortion. As she wrote in 2008, the “claim that women need 
                                                                                                                          
about how abortion hurts women.” (quoting Monica Davey, National Battle over Abortion Focuses on 
South Dakota Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2006, at A5)). 
8 Alvaré, supra note 1, at 380 (claiming that “contraception affects the ‘marketplaces’ for sex and 
marriage” by “lowering the ‘price’ of sex, by separating sexual intercourse from the understanding that 
sex makes children,” and thereby increasing pressure on women to have sex outside of marriage); id. at 
399 (arguing that contraception affects “sex and mating markets”). Alvaré argues that “[s]ingle women 
thus feel pressured, because if they do not participate in sex, they are at a classic competitive 
disadvantage because [s]exual activity without commitment is increasingly expected in premarital 
relationships,” and that “the current sex and mating market enabled by contraception and abortion 
operates to the disadvantage of women, and the relative advantage of men, due to a series of incentives 
structured by their availability.” Id. at 409 (internal quotation marks omitted). In making this argument, 
Alvaré reflects a view similar to that expressed by Pope Pius XI in 1930 concerning the ramifications 
of granting women equal status in marriage—that equality in marriage was a “false liberty and 
unnatural equality” that would be to “the detriment of the woman herself.” Pope Pius XI, Encyclical 
Letter, Casti Connubii (On Christian Marriage) (Dec. 31, 1930). A woman who “descends from her 
truly regal throne to which she has been raised within the walls of the home” would “soon be reduced 
to the old state of slavery . . . and become as amongst the pagans the mere instrument of man.” Id.  
9 To be clear, it is my belief that difficulties women have in achieving and maintaining equality in 
the world of sex, love, and family formation, stem not from women’s sexual equality and liberation, but 
rather from continued enforcement of sexual norms that, among other things, prioritize the fulfillment 
of male sexual desire over the fulfillment of female sexual desire. This enforcement of old sexual status 
norms despite new legal regimes providing increased sexual freedom for women conforms to what 
Reva Siegel has called “preservation through transformation,” the idea that even after legal structures 
that reinforced certain status regimes are upset, those who contested the change in the legal structures 
will continue to attempt to enforce the old status regime with modern arguments.  See Reva Siegel, 
“The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996) 
(arguing that “civil rights reform can breathe new life into a body of status law, by pressuring legal 
elites to translate it into a more contemporary, and less controversial, social idiom”). This point 
deserves its own treatment and is beyond the scope of this Article.  
10 Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and 
Questions on Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 264 (1992) [hereinafter Reasoning from the 
Body]. 
11 Id. at 334.   
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protection from abortion has been spreading within the anti-abortion 
movement for decades and played a central role in arguments for the 
abortion ban” enacted and later defeated in South Dakota.12 Like the earlier 
appeals to nature and physiology, these woman-protective claims 
emphasize women’s physiology and emotional makeup in advancing the 
claim that abortion is physically and psychologically harmful. 
As this Article documents, these woman-protective arguments have not 
been confined to objections to abortion, but have migrated to undergird 
opposition to contraception. The purpose of inserting this claim in the 
movement against contraceptive access is to extend the reach of “woman 
protective” arguments used to support restrictions on abortion13 and 
ultimately to embed these arguments in the law.14 If successful, this 
“abortionification,” as I’ve begun to call it, of contraceptives—which 
includes redefining some contraceptives as abortifacients—could 
undermine, or at the least prevent the expansion of, government programs 
that provide contraceptives or coverage of contraceptives,15 such as the 
Medicaid, Medicare, Title X programs,16 and the insurance programs 
                                                                                                                          
12 Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 7, at 1643. 
13 See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under 
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1732–33 (2008) [hereinafter Dignity and the Politics of 
Protection] (discussing the impact of the insertion of “woman-protective” language in the Supreme 
Court’s decision upholding a restriction on abortion in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 
(2007)); id. at 1734, n.116 (citing Memorandum from James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson on Pro-
Life Strategy Issues 6 (Aug. 7, 2007), available at http://operationrescue.org/pdfs/Bopp%20Memo%2 
0re%20State%20HLA.pdf (promoting an incrementalist approach to restricting abortion and expressing 
concern about the potential that the Court could adopt a broader equality protective framework in a 
case that does not involve incremental restrictions)); Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 7, at 
1642–43, n.8 (“The woman-protective argument that appears in Carhart seems to have entered the case 
not through findings of Congress or the lower courts, but rather through amicus briefs filed in the 
Supreme Court . . . .”). 
14 In the abortion context, “woman-protective” reasoning is at the core of arguments about the 
proper standard to be applied in cases where the state claims that restrictions on abortion—such as 
hospital admitting privilege requirements, restrictions on medical abortions, and abortion clinic 
physical plant requirements—serve a state interest in women’s health. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood 
Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[U]nnecessary health regulations that have 
the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an 
undue burden on the right.” (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis omitted)); Planned Parenthood of 
Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 593 (5th Cir. 2014) (“The opinion next 
concluded that the statute places an undue burden on women seeking an abortion.” (emphasis added)); 
Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 789 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The plaintiffs . . . argue 
that the statute would do nothing to improve women’s health . . . .”); Planned Parenthood Southeast, 
Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1340–41 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (“The plaintiffs further argue that the 
clinic closures would impose significant harms on women seeking abortions and that the justifications 
are weak.”). 
15 See, e.g., Rachel Benson Gold, The Implications of Defining When a Woman Is Pregnant, 8 
GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUB. POL’Y, No. 2, 2005, at 7, 10 (reporting that some states have enacted 
measures that exclude emergency contraceptives from Medicaid coverage on the ground that users of 
contraceptives intend to terminate pregnancies). 
16 Titles XVIII and XIX of the Social Security Amendments Act of 1965, P.L. 89-97, created the 
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provided pursuant to the Affordable Care Act.17 As importantly, the 
attempt to clothe opposition to contraceptives in a benevolent concern for 
women’s welfare is revealed here as a pretext for promoting a familiar, if 
outmoded, moral view that sexual intercourse is immoral if undertaken for 
pleasure alone, without the risk of pregnancy.18 Sex for pleasure, at least 
for women, is rejected.19  
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part II first reviews nineteenth-
century and early twentieth-century reasoning about contraceptives. It 
demonstrates that the original opponents of contraception believed that the 
immorality occasioned by contraceptives, that is non-procreative sex, 
caused illness.20 Part II then traces the changing modes of reasoning used 
by advocates,21 modern medicine,22 and courts23 that led to the landmark 
                                                                                                                          
Medicare and Medicaid programs that provide health insurance to the elderly and disabled, and to low-
income individuals, respectively. Title X of the 1970 Public Health Service Act, P.L. 91-572, created a 
federal grant program dedicated solely to providing individuals with comprehensive family planning 
and related preventive health services.  
17 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, P.L. 111-148 (2010). 
18 See, e.g., LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN:  A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL 
POLITICS IN AMERICA 1 (3d ed. 2002) (“The acceptability of birth control has always depended on a 
morality that separates sex from reproduction. In the nineteenth century, when the birth control 
movement began, such a separation was widely considered immoral.”); id at 9 (“[C]onservatives . . . 
typically acceded to the notion that women were purer than men and that the only worthy purpose of 
sexual activity was reproduction.”); id. at 161 (“They were . . . suspicious of contraception. They clung 
to notions . . . that sexual intercourse ought to be for reproduction. . . . The characteristic nineteenth-
century suspicion of sexual pleasure itself shone through.”). 
19 See id. at 9, 11 (“[T]he essence of Victorian sexual respectability was hypocrisy. Victorian 
social norms preached the debilitating effects of sexual activity and the bracing effects of self-denial 
and chastity, but the Victorians simultaneously created a gigantic prostitution industry, and it was not 
unusual for ‘respectable’ men to patronize it. . . . This hypocrisy operated a double standard:  the ‘fair 
sex’ was to be protected from dirty matters such as . . . sex. . . . Sex drive became, supposedly, a 
uniquely masculine trait. . . . Female chastity was no longer just a man’s right but now also a woman’s 
destiny . . . . The motherhood ideology also defined the context in which sexuality was allowable for 
women: the only justifiable purpose of sexual intercourse for ‘respectable’ women was reproduction.” 
(internal footnote omitted)). 
20 See, e.g., id. at 106–07 (surveying late nineteenth-century medical works that concluded that 
contraception was “physically harmful,” and “as a mortal threat” posed complications such as 
“hardening of the uterus” and “permanent sterility”  (internal footnotes and citations omitted)). 
21 See, e.g., id. at 138–39, 171–72 (comparing the efforts of pre-WWI radical sexual revolution 
leaders to transform the birth control issue into a broader agenda that united women’s rights with civil 
liberties, labor movements, and socialist ideology, with the later efforts of the “professional” reformers 
who broke ties with socialists and radicals and relied on “centralized and professional campaign[s]” 
that opened clinics and lobbied for legislation). 
22 See, e.g., Note, Judicial Regulation of Birth Control under Obscenity Laws, 50 YALE L.J. 682, 
685 (1941) (“By permitting medical use of contraceptives, the federal courts have removed the 
impediment to vast improvements in public health standards threatened by archaic national legislation. 
Both maternal and infant welfare may demand intelligent child spacing and postponement of 
pregnancies until women are physically fit to undertake them.” (internal footnote omitted)). 
23 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 505 (1965) (White, J., concurring) (reasoning 
that Connecticut could not have grounded its ban on contraception on the notion that use of 
contraception is immoral or unwise in itself). 
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holdings in Griswold v. Connecticut24 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,25 providing 
constitutional protection for the right to contraceptives. Part III then turns 
to discuss the modern revival of the Comstock era modes of reasoning 
about contraception.  As it explains, modern opponents of contraceptive 
access express anxiety about the ability of these moral arguments to 
persuade.  In response, they consciously decided to argue that 
contraception harms women’s health, vowing to cite the best science “we 
can currently lay our hands on”26 to support those claims. In making this 
discursive move, contraception opponents have connected contraception to 
abortion to disrupt the gains made by Griswold and Eisenstadt, which 
normalized contraceptive use in many ways.  By linking contraception to 
abortion, and emphasizing a claim that it harms women, opponents 
cultivate a sense that contraception, like abortion, is immoral27 and 
detrimental to women’s health.28  
Part IV responds directly to these emergent health claims.  The 
problem for advocates is that they get the science wrong.  This Article 
establishes the safety of hormonal contraceptives and the benefits they 
provide to women’s and children’s health.29 As it shows, contraceptives 
pose few serious health risks to most women,30 actually reduce the risks of 
some serious conditions to all women,31 and are far safer than the 
alternative for sexually active women—that alternative being pregnancy.32 
                                                                                                                          
24 Id. at 485–86 (holding that Connecticut’s ban on contraceptives violated married couples’ 
constitutional right to marital privacy).  
25 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (holding that Massachusetts’s ban on contraceptives for use by non-
married individuals, while allowing such use by married persons, violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
26 Helen Alvaré, The White House and Sexualityism, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (July 16, 2012), 
www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/07/5757/ (“I propose to examine th[e] ideology [of equal sexual 
liberty], not only from a woman’s perspective, but also from the best scientific evidence we can 
currently lay our hands on.”). 
27 See, e.g., Allan C. Carlson, Comstockery, Contraception, and the Family: The Remarkable 
Achievements of an Anti-Vice Crusader, 23 FAM. AM.: ONLINE EDITION 3 (2009), available at 
http://profam.org/pub/fia/fia.2301.htm (“Comstock’s greatest intellectual and political achievement was 
to link abortion and contraception to the availability of obscene literature in city streets. Countless 
observers have pointed to both aspects of linkage—abortion equals contraception and both acts equal 
obscenity—as naïve, foolish, and the product of raw ignorance. In truth, Comstock’s views on 
contraception were framed by his sense of the dangers facing children and by his own psychology of 
the human mind; and they enjoyed the full support of a new and progressive American medical 
leadership.” (internal footnotes, citations, quotations, and quotation marks omitted)). 
28 See infra Part III.  See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 27, at 4 (“Comstock linked abortion and 
contraception together for the common danger they posed to women’s health. In this view, Comstock 
actually stood in solidarity with the cutting-edge medical authorities of his day.”). 
29 See infra Part IV.C (arguing that contraceptives improve the health of children by, inter alia, 
allowing women to increase the space between births). 
30 See infra Part IV.B.1–3 (citing data discussing risks and benefits of hormonal contraceptives). 
31 See infra Part IV.B–D (discussing medical evidence that use of contraceptives is far safer than 
pregnancy, does not increase risks of cancer and actually reduces the risks of some cancers). 
32 See, e.g., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN:  
CLOSING THE GAPS 105–07 (2011), available at http://www/nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13181 
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This Part also makes clear that the claim that contraception is bad for 
women’s health has normative content—that it is based on the view that 
women should refrain from sexual activity unless they are willing to carry 
any pregnancy that results to term.  
Part V focuses on the attempt to equate contraception and abortion. As 
this Article shows, opposition to hormonal contraceptives is not truly based 
on the view that these methods of contraception are actually abortifacients, 
or even on the claim that the destruction of a fertilized egg is immoral and 
should be considered an abortion. Rather, the argument goes much deeper 
to undergird a more general objection to all forms of contraception and to 
the ability of women to have sex without accepting the possibility of 
pregnancy and motherhood.33 On this account, the real objection to 
contraception is not its detrimental effects on women’s health, but that it 
allows women to be sexual beings who can avoid their “natural” roles as 
mothers.34  
Finally, the Article ends with the good news in Part VI that programs 
providing increased access to the most effective contraception are already 
having a significant positive impact on the health of women and children, 
reducing rates of teen pregnancy, unintended pregnancy, poor pregnancy 
outcomes, and abortions.35   
II:  NINETEENTH CENTURY OPPOSITION TO CONTRACEPTION  
Women have been using various methods to control reproduction for 
millennia.36 In the ancient world, long before humans understood the most 
basic facts about the human reproductive process, people used homemade 
folk remedies to attempt to prevent conception, with some success.37 These 
                                                                                                                          
(reporting, inter alia, that the mortality rate in non-smoking users of contraception is significantly 
lower than the maternal death rate in live births). 
33 See infra Part V (showing that opposition to four of these contraceptives has not been 
withdrawn despite definitive scientific evidence that they do not work by preventing implantation of a 
fertilized egg and so cannot be said to terminate a “pregnancy” under any definition of that term). 
34 See, e.g., Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 10, at 299 (discussing the antiquated 
notion that women should have little control over their reproductive destiny because their role as life-
givers is to ensure “reproduction of the social order”). 
35 See infra Part VI (citing data from recent studies examining impact of providing full options 
counseling and access to most effective contraceptives). 
36 See GORDON, supra note 18, at 7–9, 13 (“People have tried to control reproduction in virtually 
all known societies . . . . [B]irth control was widely practiced in pre-agricultural and nomadic 
societies . . . . There is a prevalent myth . . . that birth control technology came to use with modern 
medicine. This is far from the truth, as modern medicine did almost nothing prior to the 1950s to 
improve on birth control devices that were literally more than a millennium old.” (relying on NORMAN 
E. HIMES, MEDICAL HISTORY OF CONTRACEPTION 3–4 (1936)).  
37 See id. at 13 (“Birth control was not invented by scientists or doctors. It is part of folk culture, 
and women’s folklore in particular, in nearly all societies. . . . An extensive folklore of birth control 
was handed down from generation to generation in most traditional societies. . . . [There were a] variety 
of attempts to prevent conception, and creativity . . . behind them . . . . They [were] developed by 
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remedies included: homemade suppositories designed to coat the cervix 
and prevent sperm from passing into the uterus, various spermicidal agents 
made with acidic liquids like citrus juices or vinegar, rudimentary 
diaphragms or other devices that were placed over the cervical opening, 
various medicines or “potions,” douching or other attempts to “wash” 
sperm out of the vagina after intercourse, rudimentary condoms using 
animal skins or plants, withdrawal prior to ejaculation, and the “rhythm” 
method.38 While these methods were improved upon over millennia, the 
effectiveness of contraceptives was not significantly improved until the 
development of rubber condoms and diaphragms in the nineteenth century, 
and the introduction of hormonal contraceptives in the twentieth century.39 
While birth control was “morally and religiously stigmatized in many 
parts of [the] world,” it was also widely practiced.40 Use of contraception 
was opposed by many, though not all, religious authorities on the theory 
that interference with the procreative function of sex was immoral.41 The 
basis for this opposition is reflected in the words of Pope Pius XI who 
pronounced the view of the Roman Catholic Church in an Encyclical 
Letter issued in 1930: 
[T]he conjugal act is destined primarily by nature for the 
                                                                                                                          
practice—through trial and error—in response to people’s needs. A cataloging of the extent, variety, 
and ingenuity of these practices is eloquent testimony to the intensity of women’s concern.”); see also 
id. at 16 (“[T]here is striking continuity between abortion techniques used in ancient societies and those 
used in modern ‘home-remedy’ abortions.”). 
38 See id. at 14, 16, 18–21 (outlining and describing all of the aforementioned pre-modern 
contraception and abortion practices). 
39 See id. at 14 (“All [pre-modern] techniques were practiced in the ancient world and in modern 
preindustrial societies. Indeed, until modern hormonal chemicals there were no essentially new birth 
control devices, only improvements of the old.”); id. at 32 (“[A] thriving nineteenth-century market 
provided contraceptive devices that did work. . . . Condoms were second in popularity to male 
withdrawal, according to the clinic studies of the 1920s and 1930s.”); see also LARA MARKS, SEXUAL 
CHEMISTRY: A HISTORY OF THE CONTRACEPTIVE PILL 3–4 (2001) (noting that increased effectiveness 
of the pill as well as other factors made the pill, first marketed in 1960, “a whole new bag of beans” 
(internal citations, quotation marks, and footnotes omitted)). By 1960, as demonstrated by the plaintiffs 
in the Poe v. Ullman litigation, one study showed “a failure of contraception in 14% of the cases 
studied with couples relying on the condom, 17.2% by those employing the diaphragm, and 48.2% by 
persons employing all other methods.” Brief for Appellants at 12, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) 
(No. 60) (citing Alan Guttmacher, et. al., Contraception Among Two Thousand Private Obstetric 
Patients, 140 JAMA 1265, 1267 (1949)). The effectiveness of modern contraceptives has taken a huge 
leap forward in the last fifty years, with some methods now approaching 100% effectiveness, even with 
typical use. See Div. of Reprod. Health, Nat’l Ctr. For Chronic Disease Prevention and Health 
Promotion, U.S. Medical Eligibility Criteria for Contraceptive Use, 2010, 59 MORBIDITY AND 
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, June 18, 2010, at 1, 5 (reporting rates of effectiveness with typical use 
of certain contraceptives, including 99.2% and 99.8% for the two forms of intra-uterine devices,  
99.95% for the implant,  92% for the combined oral contraceptive pills and 92% for the pill (99.78% if 
use is perfect)).  
40 GORDON, supra note 18, at 7. 
41 See id. at 7, 9, 14 (discussing the condemnation of birth control by Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam). 
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begetting of children . . . . [T]hose who in exercising it 
deliberately frustrate its natural power and purpose sin 
against nature and commit a deed which is shameful and 
intrinsically vicious.42 
Despite the condemnation of contraceptive use by many religious 
authorities, in post-Revolutionary America birth control techniques were 
used by many, and their use appears to have increased significantly from 
the late eighteenth century—when women usually gave birth to eight 
children—until the start of the twentieth century when in 1900 the average 
married woman gave birth to three children.43 While social disapproval 
drove the practice underground, a legal framework restricting 
contraceptives was not established in the United States until 1873 with the 
enactment of the Comstock Act,44 a federal law banning, among other 
things, the manufacture, sale, advertisement, distribution through the mails, 
and importation of contraceptives.45 As originally introduced, the bill 
included a kind of health exception, allowing for prescriptions issued by “a 
physician in good standing, given in good faith.”46 The bill was then 
amended and the exception deleted,47 though it was unclear whether 
Congress understood how the contraceptive ban would work, much less 
that the amendment deleted the physician’s exception.48 
                                                                                                                          
42 Casti Connubii, supra note 8, at ¶54. In the same document, the Church condemned divorce, 
see id. at 12, sex outside of marriage, see id. at ¶34, ¶79, and the emancipation of women, see id. at ¶26 
(noting the “primacy of the husband with regard to the wife and children, the ready subjection of the 
wife and her willing obedience”); see id. at ¶75 (noting in response to those who argued that women 
should be considered equal in marriage to men, “this false liberty and unnatural equality with the 
husband is to the detriment of the woman herself, for if the woman descends from her truly regal throne 
to which she has been raised within the walls of the home by means of the Gospel, she will soon be 
reduced to the old state of slavery (if not in appearance, certainly in reality) and become as amongst the 
pagans the mere instrument of man”). 
43 See GORDON, supra note 18, at 22–23 (noting that family size did not change as dramatically as 
the number of births; that the decrease in infant mortality rates over the nineteenth century meant 
women did not have to bear as many children to end up with a family of five; and that her account does 
not take into consideration pregnancies that resulted in abortion).  
44 Comstock Act, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873) (naming the law “An Act for the Suppression of 
Trade in, and Circulation of, obscene Literature and Articles of immoral Use”).  
45 Id. at 598–99.  
46 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1436 (1873) (discussing Bill S. No. 1572 prohibiting sale of 
“any obscene . . . [literature or images] or other article of indecent or immoral nature, or any article or 
medicine for the prevention of conception, or for causing abortion, except on a prescription of a 
physician in good standing, given in good faith, or shall advertise the same for sale . . . or shall 
manufacture [the same],  . . . or shall print any such article”). 
47 See id. at 1571 (approving the bill without the exemption); Comstock Act, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 
(1873) (failing to provide a good faith medical exception in the final act). 
48 As others have reported, the substance of the Congressional Debate over the Comstock Act was 
extremely limited, and some members of Congress complained that they did not have time to fully 
understand the bill in general or the amendment in particular. Judicial Regulation of Birth Control 
Under Obscenity Laws, supra note 22, at 682 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1436–37, 
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A.  Obscenity and the Connection Between Immorality and Health 
As evidenced by the Congressional debates over the Comstock Act, 
these nineteenth century opponents of contraception were fueled by the 
belief that illness was punishment for immoral sexual behavior. The ban on 
the manufacture and sale of contraceptives was enacted as part of a broader 
“purity campaign”49 taking aim at the use of the mails to distribute 
“obscene literature,” images considered obscene because of their ability to 
cause sexual excitement.50 Congress was scandalized when it discovered 
that trade in “obscene” or “immoral” literature was widespread.51 
Representative Merriam of New York denounced the trade as a “nefarious 
and diabolical traffic” that was a threat to the Republic and the “vigor and 
purity of our youth.”52 He called “the attention of the country to this 
monstrous crime,” and urged Congress to do all that they could 
legislatively to achieve its “annihilation.”53 Merriam made an appeal to 
masculinity, calling on his fellow Congressmen to bring “the outraged 
manhood of our age” to condemn what “womanhood” had failed to stop, 
that is: 
the low brutality which threatened to destroy the future of 
this Republic by making merchandise of the morals of our 
youth. Recent revelations have convinced us that no home, 
however carefully guarded, no school however select, has 
                                                                                                                          
1524–25, 1571 (1873)) (providing discussion of the bill in the United States Senate); CONG. GLOBE, 
42d Cong., 3d Sess. 2004 app. at 168–69 (1873) (providing a discussion of the bill in the House of 
Representatives)); see also Peter Smith, The History and Future of the Legal Battle over Birth Control, 
49 CORNELL L.Q. 275, 276 (1964) (highlighting that very little debate or discussion accompanied the 
amendment removing the physician exemption from the act). On the other hand, the debate on the 
whole reveals a Congress that was intent on enacting a more rather than less restrictive bill. See CONG. 
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1524–25 (1873) (reassuring other Senators that the amendment to the bill 
removing the physician exemption made “no material alteration in the section” and that “[i]t is rather to 
strengthen it than otherwise”). 
49 For a discussion on the emergence of “purity campaign” as a phrase that encapsulated the effort 
to curtail the distribution of “offensive materials,” see Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to 
Censor: Freedom of Expression Versus the Desire to Sanitize Society—From Anthony Comstock to 2 
Live Crew, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741, 747 (1992).  
50 See Judicial Regulation of Birth Control Under Obscenity Laws, supra note 22, at 682 (“By 
forbidding the mailing, importation, and interstate transportation of indecent articles and obscene 
publications and ‘contraceptives,’ Congress hoped to check the moral degeneration that followed the 
Civil War.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Smith, supra note 48, at 275–76 (noting that section 
two of the Comstock Act “prohibited the use of the mails for the sending of any of the materials or 
articles outlawed in section one” (internal citations omitted)).  
51 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. app. 168 (1873) (statement of Rep. C.L. Merriam) 
(reporting on the seizure of 15,000 “letters written by students of both sexes throughout our land 
ordering obscene literature”); id. at 1524 (statement of Sen. George Edmunds) (citing a Senate debate 
where Senator Edmunds referred to the Comstock Act as the “immoral literature” bill).  
52 Id. app. at 168.   
53 Id. app. at 169.  
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been safe from these corrupting influences. The purity and 
beauty of womanhood has been no protection from the 
insults of this trade.54 
Merriam lamented the revelations that even “in some of our best 
schools,” children “were students of a debasing literature, thrust upon them 
by insidious and cowardly hands . . . a literature which kindles and 
inflames the brute forces born in man, and over which religion and 
education strive to obtain the mastery.”55 He decried the “destruction [of] 
some promising boys, who, but for the deadly poison instilled into their 
young minds might have developed into wise and good men.”56 Sexual 
desire aroused by obscene literature was considered so destructive that 
Merriam claimed that “victims of this traffic [of obscene literature] have 
filled the prisons and mad-houses,” and the literature “corrupt[ed] the 
principles, . . . inflame[d] the passions, . . . excite[d] impure desire, 
and . . . spread a blight over all the powers of the soul.”57   
The inclusion of a ban on contraceptive devices and abortafacients in 
the obscene literature bill was urged by Anthony Comstock,58 a well-
known crusader and member of the New York Committee on the 
Suppression of Vice.59 To support the connection between contraceptives 
and the corrupting influence of obscene literature, Comstock reported that 
his investigations found that the businesses were often combined.60 
Moreover, contraception and abortion, like obscene literature, were 
considered to promote sex for pleasure rather than purely for procreation. 
Enacted at a time when pastors and parents warned that masturbation 
would make you go blind, obscene literature and contraceptives were 
considered part of the same evil to be stopped, the same threat to the “vigor 
and purity” of the Nation.61 Where obscene literature “inflame[d]” 
desires,62 contraceptives and abortion enabled people to act on their sexual 
desires and engage in sex while escaping the fear of procreation and 
                                                                                                                          
54 Id. app. at 168.  
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. app. at 169.  
58 See id. app. at 168–69 (quoting Comstock letter, included in Representative’s speech, stating, “I 
could easily detect and convict [men engaging in the traffic of obscene literature] if the law was only 
sufficient. . . . [A]ll we want to break up this nefarious business is a broader law”).  
59 Margaret A. Blanchard & John E. Semonche, Anthony Comstock and His Adversaries: The 
Mixed Legacy of This Battle for Free Speech, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 317, 320, 323 (2006).  
60 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 168 (noting that those who sold the offending 
pictures and pornographic stories also sold “rubber articles for masturbation or for the professed 
prevention of conception” through the mails). 
61 See id. (discussing the need to preserve the country’s youth by suppressing “trade in and 
circulation of obscene literature and articles of immoral use”).  
62 Id.  
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sexually transmitted diseases.63   
Although the Congressional debates over the Comstock Act were 
abbreviated,64 the debates show that drawing the connection between 
expression of sexual desire for its own sake and ill health was essential to 
the opposition. Opponents of contraceptives, nineteenth century physicians 
prominent among them,65 stressed that sexual “impurity”—meaning sex for 
pleasure rather than procreation—bred weakness, a lack of vigor, and 
ultimately could make you physically ill.66 While the health of the entire 
nation’s youth was at stake, crusaders against contraception expressed the 
greatest concern for women’s health, exhibiting a woman-protective 
reasoning that served crusaders well at the time given the significant 
dangers of illegal abortions. Specifically, physicians claimed that 
contraceptives would cause “hardening” of the uterus, sterility,67 “[l]ocal 
congestions, nervous affections and debilities,” and other “diseases of the 
genital organ, from simple inflammation to the most serious 
degenerations.”68 
Both historian Linda Gordon, and Reva Siegel in her seminal article, 
Reasoning from the Body, trace the history of arguments made by leaders 
of the campaigns to criminalize abortion and contraception.69 Physicians 
argued that abortion and contraception were both evils, united in posing a 
                                                                                                                          
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1436–37, 1524–25, 1571 (providing the transcript for debates over obscene literature 
within the Senate). Consideration in the House of Representatives was even more abbreviated. See id. 
at 2004, app. at 168–69 (providing the transcript for debates over obscene literature within the House). 
65 Much has been written about the prominent role of nineteenth century physicians in the 
campaign to make contraception and abortions illegal and to obtain a near monopoly over the treatment 
of upper and middle class women’s diseases, reproductive health care in particular, by limiting the role 
of mid-wives.  See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 18, at 105–24; id. at 106 (“Physicians had obtained a 
monopoly on the treatment of upper- and middle-class women’s diseases and pregnancies in part by 
forcing out midwives and popular healers . .  Birth control, part of the growing self-assertion of women 
generally, particularly annoyed many doctors.”). See Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 10, 
at 281–87 (citing also LINDA GORDON, WOMAN’S BODY, WOMAN’S RIGHT:  A SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA (1976); KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 
(1984); JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA:  THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL 
POLICY, 1800-1900 (1978)). 
66 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 168-69.  
67 GORDON, supra note 18, at 106–07.     
68 Carlson, supra note 27 (quoting H.R. Storer, The Criminality and Physical Evils of Forced 
Abortions, 16 and L.F.E. BERGERET, THE PREVENTIVE OBSTACLE, OR CONJUGAL ONANISM:  THE 
DANGERS AND INCONVENIENCES TO THE INDIVIDUAL, TO THE FAMILY, AND TO SOCIETY, OF FRAUDS IN 
THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE GENERATIVE FUNCTIONS 6 (P.  DeMarmon trans., 1870)).  See also id. 
(noting physician “‘catalogue[d] the female diseases’ caused by these practices”) (citing Horatio 
Robinson Storer, The Criminality and Physical Evils of Forced Abortions, 16 TRANSACTIONS OF THE 
AM. MED. ASS’N 741 (1866)); id. (citing D. Humphreys Storer, Two Frequent Causes of Uterine 
Disease, 6 J. GYNAECOLOGICAL SOC’Y BOS. 194, 195–203 (1855)). 
69 GORDON, supra note 18, at 106–07; Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 10, at 265.   
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danger to women’s health.70 For example, a tract entitled Conjugal Sins 
condemned as “linked and like evils, masturbation, contraception, and 
abortion,” while a lecture entitled On Conjugal Onanism and Kindred Sins 
delivered by a physician prominent in the anti-abortion campaign to 
students at the University of Pennsylvania “sought to demonstrate the 
diseases attributable to the interruption of intercourse.”71 The physician 
argued that: 
[M]an must suffer the punishment of the onanist if he parts 
with the ‘seed of another life’ in any other way than in that 
which it tends to become fruitful . . . [but] [t]he wife suffers 
the most, because she both sins and is sinned against. She 
sins because she shirks those responsibilities for which she 
was created. She is sinned against, because she is defrauded 
of her [conjugal] rights . . . .72  
Yet another leader of the campaign to criminalize abortion argued that “the 
prevention of pregnancy, by whatever means it may be sought, by cold 
vaginal injections, or by incomplete or impeded sexual intercourse, is alike 
destructive to sensual enjoyment and to the woman’s health.”73 
Linda Gordon documents the claims made by physicians of the time 
“that contraception was physically harmful, and the harm often described 
as a mortal threat.”74 These physicians referred to the use of birth control 
during sex between a married couple as “onanism” and “marital 
masturbation.”75 Sometimes the claim was that interfering in the sex act’s 
possible procreative function caused the harm.  Sometimes the claim went 
further.  At least one physician opponent of birth control and abortion 
“charged that not having children was in itself unhealthy:  a woman still 
childless at twenty-five would have a ‘continuous tendency to degeneracy 
and atrophy of the reproductive organs.’”76 Having a few children was not 
enough; continuous childbearing every two to three years was said to be 
necessary for “permanent good health.”77  Indeed, according to a 
contemporary anti-contraception advocate, when chiding a young female 
journalist for seeking the decriminalization of contraception, Comstock 
identified contraception as working “the greatest demoralization” and 
                                                                                                                          
70 Id. at 293; see also id. at 293 n.119 (“[C]linical case histories of women suffering diseases 
attributed to conjugal onanism.”). 
71 Id. at 293. 
72 Id. (internal quotation omitted).  
73 Id. at 294 n.122 (quoting HORATIO ROBINSON STORER, WHY NOT? A BOOK FOR EVERY 
WOMAN 61 (Boston: Lee & Shepard 1868)). 
74 GORDON, supra note 18, at 106–07.     
75 Id. at 107. 
76 Id. (citation omitted).  
77 Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 10, at 294 n.123 (quoting HORATIO ROBINSON 
STORER, IS IT I?, A BOOK FOR EVERY MAN 115-16 (photo. reprint  1974) (Boston, Lee & Shepard  1868). 
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specifically married immorality and disease declaring: 
God has set certain natural barriers. If you turn loose the 
passions and break down the fear you 
bring . . . disaster. . . . It would debase sacred things, break 
down the health of women, and disseminate a greater curse 
than the plagues and diseases of Europe.78  
B.  Federal and State Court Litigation After Comstock and the Rise of a 
Social Movement 
Attempts to repeal or modify the Comstock Act in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries were unsuccessful.79 Ultimately though, 
advocates for birth control,80 and a small group of sex reformers who 
worked against sexual repression at the turn of the century,81 altered 
societal acceptance of contraceptives and sex for pleasure.82 As medical 
knowledge about contraceptives and reproductive functions modernized, 
the Comstock Act’s connection between obscenity and immorality on the 
one hand and contraceptives on the other hand proved the undoing of the 
                                                                                                                          
78 Carlson, supra note 27. 
79 See Smith, supra note 48, at 276–77 (indicating that there were “unsuccessful attempts to repeal 
or modify the Comstock Act” in 1878, 1919, 1923, and many times between 1930 and 1936). 
80 Much has been written about the motives of early birth control advocates, such as Margaret 
Sanger and the original founders of Planned Parenthood. There is significant evidence that one purpose 
of promoting birth control was to limit family size among immigrants, African-Americans freed from 
slavery, and the poor. GORDON, supra note 18, at 196–97. Though a small band of “free love” 
advocates pressed for reforms for the right of all to express sexual desire in consensual circumstances, 
see, e.g., id. at 126, the right to contraception as an issue of sexual freedom and women’s equality did 
not become a prominent aspect of the movement until the mid-twentieth century. For different views on 
the legacy of Margaret Sanger, compare ANGELA FRANKS, MARGARET SANGER’S EUGENIC LEGACY: 
THE CONTROL OF FEMALE FERTILITY 66 (2005) (arguing that Sanger had a genuine commitment to the 
eugenic ideology), with ELLEN CHESLER, WOMAN OF VALOR: MARGARET SANGER AND THE BIRTH 
CONTROL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 195–96 (1992) (arguing that Sanger did not believe in the more 
“offensive” assumptions underlying the eugenics movement, and saw eugenics as a method of 
“controlled fertility” which would help women gain educational and economic opportunities). 
81 For a short discussion of the work of these reformers, see GORDON, supra note 18, at 138–52. 
See also EMMA GOLDMAN, ANARCHISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 233, 237 (2d ed. 1911) (arguing that love 
is free and should be separated from marriage and that “[i]t is safe to say that a large percentage of the 
unhappiness, misery, distress, and physical suffering of matrimony is due to the criminal ignorance in 
sex matters that is being extolled as a great virtue”). 
82 Public opinion polls at the time confirmed the change in views. See Judicial Regulation of Birth 
Control Under Obscenity Laws, supra note 22, at 685–86 n.35 (describing poll results which indicated 
public opposition to birth control laws). In addition, studies confirmed a rise in sexual activity. See 
GORDON, supra note 18, at 130–31 (describing a study of college-educated women which found that 
women born between 1890–1899 had “twice as high a percentage of premarital intercourse as those 
born before 1890,” and the trend continued. Of those born before 1890, 13.5% experienced intercourse 
before marriage; of those born between 1890–99, the percentage increased to 26%; of those born 
between 1900–1909, 48.8% had premarital intercourse; and of those born after 1909, 68.3% had 
intercourse prior to marriage). 
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Act’s contraceptive ban.  In 1936, in a case challenging forfeiture of a 
package of contraceptives that had been ordered under the federal 
importation ban,83 the Second Circuit reasoned that because contraceptive 
use to promote health was no longer considered immoral, a federal law 
intending to prevent immoral behavior could no longer be interpreted to 
preclude the use of contraceptives to promote health. As a result, the court 
held that the federal statute did not apply to physicians who sought to save 
the lives and promote the health of their patients.84 These physicians were 
“excepted by implication from the literal terms of the statute.”85 Noting 
that state law allowed for the sale of contraception to physicians “who may 
in good faith prescribe their use for the cure or prevention of disease,”86 the 
Court wrote: 
All the statutes we have referred to were part of a continuous 
scheme to suppress immoral articles and obscene literature 
and should so far as possible be construed together and 
consistently. If this be done, the articles here in question 
ought not to be forfeited when not intended for an immoral 
purpose.87 
As a 1941 Note published in the Yale Law Journal commented, “[b]y 
permitting medical use of contraceptives, the federal courts have removed 
the impediment to vast improvements in public health standards threatened 
by archaic national legislation.”88  
After the teeth were removed from the federal Comstock Act, though, 
state laws restricting access to contraceptives remained. In the early 
twentieth century, courts issued influential decisions holding tight to moral 
reasoning to uphold bans on contraceptive prescribing in states with some 
of the most restrictive laws in the country—New York, Massachusetts, and 
                                                                                                                          
83 United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936). The claimant was an 
obstetrician/gynecologist named Hannah Stone who testified that “the use of contraceptives was in 
many cases necessary for the health of women” and that she prescribed the use of pessaries in cases 
where “it would not be desirable for a patient to undertake a pregnancy.” Id. at 738. This testimony was 
not disputed by the Government. Id. 
84 Id. at 738. 
85 Id.  
86 Id. (citing People v. Sanger, 118 N.E. 637, 637–38 (N.Y. 1918)). 
87 Id. at 739. 
88 Judicial Regulation of Birth Control Under Obscenity Laws, supra note 22, at 685; see also id. 
at 685 n.25 (“Maternal and infant deaths vary directly with the number of children per mother and vary 
inversely with the length of time since the last preceding birth.” (citing, inter alia, U.S. DEPT. OF 
LABOR, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CAUSAL FACTORS IN INFANT MORTALITY 48, 60 (1940)). The author 
also remarked on the alarming prevalence of unsafe abortions performed annually in the United States. 
Id. at 685 n.26 (“Abortions bring death to at least twenty-two American women every day and cause 
serious injury to countless others. Ninety per cent of such operations are performed on married 
women.” (citing DOROTHY DUNBAR BROMLEY, BIRTH CONTROL: ITS USE AND MISUSE 138 (1934))). 
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Connecticut.89 In these states, the newly formed Planned Parenthood 
League had opened clinics that distributed educational materials and birth 
control devices and advocates used civil disobedience to challenge the 
restrictive laws.90  
In 1917, a New York court rejected a constitutional challenge to the 
state law, embracing the idea that the fear of pregnancy and sexually 
transmitted infections was necessary to discourage immoral sex.91 
Contraception removed this fear, thereby encouraging immoral behavior. 
The New York trial court’s decision in People v. Byrne92 upheld the 
prosecution of Margaret Sanger’s sister for distributing an educational 
pamphlet concerning contraceptives:  
While there are other reasons that keep unmarried people 
from indulging their passions, the fear that pregnancy will 
result is one of the potent ones. To remove that fear would 
unquestionably result in an increase of immorality.93 
In that case, the court explicitly rejected the idea that women had an 
“absolute right to enjoyment of sexual relations” without the fear of 
pregnancy.94 New York’s legislature liberalized its 1881 law to allow an 
                                                                                                                          
89 See State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856, 860 (Conn. 1940) (noting that between 1873, when Congress 
enacted the Comstock Act, and 1940, at least twenty-six states passed laws relating to birth control, and 
“[o]f th[o]se, eight, including Connecticut and Massachusetts, attempt[ed] complete suppression; . . . a 
few (including New York) contain exceptions which permit prescription under certain circumstances”) 
(citing Note, Some Legislative Aspects of the Birth-Control Problem, 45 HARV. L. REV. 723, 723–24 
(1932); Note, Contraceptives and the Law, 6 U. CHI. L. REV. 260, 260–61 (1939); MARIE CARMICHAEL 
STOPES, CONTRACEPTION (BIRTH CONTROL): ITS THEORY, HISTORY AND PRACTICE; A MANUAL FOR 
THE MEDICAL AND LEGAL PROFESSIONS, 354, 355 (1924)); Smith, supra note 48, at 279 (arguing that 
Connecticut statutes were the “strictest in the nation”). 
90 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 48, at 285 (noting that the defendant violated the Comstock Act by 
selling “an article designed to prevent conception and distributing . . . pamphlets”). 
91 See, e.g., People v. Byrne, 163 N.Y.S. 682, 686 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1917) (ruling that fear of 
pregnancy and venereal diseases was necessary to discourage immorality and was within the police 
powers of the state).  
92 Id. at 682. 
93 Id. at 686 (“[T]he court is of the opinion that the public good justified the passage of this statute 
and requires its enforcement.”); see also id. (“A statute making it a crime to advertise the treatment or 
cure of venereal diseases has been held to be a valid exercise of the police power of the state, as it is 
against public policy to advertise that such diseases can be easily and cheaply cured. ‘It has a decided 
tendency to minimize unduly the disastrous consequences of indulging in dissolute action.’” (quoting 
State v. Hollinshead, 151 P. 710, 711 (Or. 1915))); see also People v. Kennedy, 142 N.W. 771, 772, 
775 (Mich. 1913) (holding that an act prohibiting the “advertisement of the treating or curing of 
venereal diseases” was constitutional). The court wrote that one pamphlet entitled “What Every Girl 
Should Know,” “contains matters which not only should not be known by every girl, but which perhaps 
should not be known by any” and “contains pictures of certain organs of a woman.” Byrne, 163 N.Y.S. 
at 684, 686. 
94 Byrne, 163 N.Y.S. at 687. The next year, the New York court interpreted the state’s statutory 
exception to be broad enough to protect a physician who in good faith gives contraceptive “help or 
advice to a married person to cure or prevent disease,” but not to permit “advertisements regarding such 
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exemption for physicians prescribing contraceptives for health purposes.95 
While many other states liberalized their laws to allow for medical use 
of contraception at the very least, Connecticut and Massachusetts held 
firmly to their Comstock era statutes and reasoning. In 1917, in 
Commonwealth v. Allison,96 the Massachusetts high court upheld that 
state’s 1879 statute banning contraceptives as within the police power of 
the state “to promote the public morals and in a broad sense the public 
health and safety.”97 The Court held that the Legislature’s purpose in 1879 
had been “to protect purity, to preserve chastity, to encourage continence 
and self restraint, to defend the sanctity of the home, and thus to engender 
in the state and nation a virile and virtuous race of men and women.”98 The 
same court confirmed this view in 1938.  In Commonwealth v. Gardner,99 
two years after the decision allowing medical prescribing under the federal 
Comstock Act, the Massachusetts court again refused to liberalize its view 
of the Massachusetts law, upholding the prosecution of doctors and nurses 
of a birth control clinic.  The court refusing to read the statute to include an 
exception permitting physicians to prescribe contraceptives even if 
intended for the “preservation of life or health,” and even if applied only to 
married women.100 The Massachusetts high court finally allowed a very 
narrow exception to sell contraceptives where “sold for the prevention of 
[venereal] disease,”101 but refused to allow prescribing to avoid pregnancy 
where the woman’s health would be particularly at risk during pregnancy. 
Just four years later, the Court confirmed the narrowness of the exception, 
upholding a conviction finding enough evidence that the defendant 
advertised “instruments or articles” with the intent that they be used for 
contraception as well as for protection against disease.102  
                                                                                                                          
matters, nor promiscuous advice to patients irrespective of their condition.” People v. Sanger, 118 N.E. 
637, 637–38 (N.Y. 1918). 
95 See Smith, supra note 48, at 278 (noting an exception to the New York statute that allowed 
physicians to prescribe contraceptive devices for the “cure and prevention of disease”). 
96 116 N.E. 265 (Mass. 1917). 
97 Id. at 266 (upholding a ban on the advertising of contraceptive drugs, medicines, or articles).   
98 Id. 
99 15 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1938). 
100 See id. at 222–24 (holding that a complete prohibition on the sale of contraceptives was 
necessary to suppress immorality); see also Commonwealth v. Corbett, 29 N.E.2d 151, 152 (Mass. 
1940) (affirming the decision in Commonwealth v. Gardner, 15 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1938), that the use 
of contraceptives by married women for whom pregnancy was “unusually dangerous to their health” 
was still prohibited). 
101 See Commonwealth v. Corbett, 307 Mass. 7, 8–9, 29 N.E.2d 151, 152 (Mass. 1940) (arguing 
that the use of condoms for prevention of disease was valid because the victims of these sexually 
transmitted infections could be “innocent” victims, such as the wives or husbands and children of a 
guilty party who contracted the disease through illicit sex).   
102 Commonwealth v. Goldberg, 55 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Mass. 1944); see also Smith, supra note 48, 
at 277–79 (arguing that Massachusetts’s strict contraception statute rivals Connecticut’s statutes, which 
are regarded as the “strictest in the nation”). 
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Similarly, in Connecticut, the prosecution of medical personnel at a 
Planned Parenthood clinic for assisting and counseling a married woman in 
the use of contraceptives in order to preserve her “general health” was 
upheld against the defendants claim that the statute was unconstitutional.103 
Citing the Massachusetts case and the early New York case approvingly, 
the Court wrote in State v. Nelson104: 
[I]t is not for us to say that the Legislature might not 
reasonably hold that the artificial limitation of even 
legitimate child-bearing would be inimical to the public 
welfare and, as well, that use of contraceptives, and 
assistance therein or tending thereto, would be injurious to 
public morals, indeed, it is not precluded from considering 
that not all married people are immune from temptation or 
inclination to extra-marital indulgence, as to which risk of 
illegitimate pregnancy is a recognized deterrent deemed 
desirable in the interests of morality.105 
The Connecticut court reversed the lower court’s ruling that the statute 
was unconstitutional unless interpreted to include this exception,106 but 
reserved the question of whether “an implied exception might be 
recognized when pregnancy would jeopardize life.”107 Just two years later, 
the Connecticut court confirmed this strict interpretation of the statute, 
refusing to interpret the statute to include an implied exception to permit a 
physician to give contraceptive information and prescriptions even to a 
married woman whose life would be jeopardized by pregnancy.108  
This refusal of Massachusetts and Connecticut courts to liberalize their 
statutes to allow contraceptives to prevent pregnancy where pregnancy 
posed a risk to the life of the woman set up the resulting challenges in Poe 
v. Ullman,109 Griswold v. Connecticut,110 and Eisenstadt v. Baird.111 In 
these cases, the Court had before it evidence refuting the claim that the use 
of medical contraceptives was or could be harmful;112 establishing the 
                                                                                                                          
103 State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856, 856–57, 860, 862 (Conn. 1940). 
104 11 A.2d 856 (Conn. 1940). 
105 See id. at 860–61 (discussing legislative power to regulate “health and morals”).   
106 Id. at 858, 862. 
107 Id. at 859 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
108 See Tileston v. Ullman, 26 A.2d 582, 584, 587–88 (Conn. 1942) (refusing to rewrite the statute 
to include an exception where an alternative to avoid harm to the woman existed, complete abstinence, 
which “the legislature was entitled to believe was reasonable and practicable”), appeal dismissed, 318 
U.S. 44, 46 (1943). 
109 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
110 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
111 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
112 See Brief of Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants 
at 28, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (No. 60) (“Medical writers generally affirm the efficacy and 
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widespread acceptance by organized religions of “the need for control of 
conception by married couples in at least some cases;”113 and in Poe and 
Griswold, establishing the extreme nature of Connecticut’s ban on the use 
of contraceptives.114  The Court issued limited opinions striking down the 
Connecticut115 and Massachusetts116 statutes, stopping well short of 
celebrating a right to consensual sex. First, in a case challenging 
Connecticut’s statute, the Court held that the law violated a married 
couples’ constitutional right to privacy.117 Griswold represented a sea 
change in that the Court did not entertain the idea that contraceptive use in 
and of itself was immoral, though the Court left open the possibility that it 
might be appropriate to use the fear of conception to deter illicit sexual 
relations.118 Finally, in a 1972 case challenging the Massachusetts statute, 
the Court stopped short of an explicit holding that single individuals had a 
constitutional privacy right to contraceptives, but implied as much. The 
Court held that if married couples had access to contraceptives, denying 
                                                                                                                          
freedom from deleterious consequences of drugs and devices for contraception.”); Brief of Planned 
Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 15, Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496) [hereinafter Brief of Planned Parenthood, Griswold] (“As 
is clear from Appendix B and the physicians’ brief, modern contraceptives are effective; they are safe; 
they are freely manufactured and are distributed by doctors, hospitals and public health agencies 
throughout the country; they are regulated (and validated) as to quality, safety and effectiveness by 
governmental agencies.”); Brief of Appellee at 20, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (No. 70-
17) (“What is involved, is this appellee’s right to disseminate information and to distribute a safe and 
medically approved article . . . .”). 
113 See Brief of Planned Parenthood, Poe, supra note 112, at 30–37 (discussing statements from 
and positions issued by Protestant churches; Jewish opinion leaders; and the Roman Catholic Church, 
which expressed a limited approval of the rhythm method). For more information on the Roman 
Catholic position, see sources cited in Brief of Planned Parenthood, Poe, supra note 112, at 35 nn.26–
27. 
114 See Brief of Planned Parenthood, Griswold, supra note 112, at 27 (“Connecticut’s prohibition 
of the use of contraceptives is unique. In no other American jurisdiction (or so far as we know, any 
foreign jurisdiction), has the state imposed such a bar to marital freedom and privacy.”); Brief of 
Planned Parenthood, Poe, supra note 112, at 37–38 (discussing the legal and widespread use of medical 
prescription of contraceptives through the United States, and stating that “Connecticut alone has 
legislated with reference to the ‘use’ of contraceptives and has construed its statute to prohibit use by 
all persons under all circumstances”). 
115 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480, 485 (holding that Connecticut’s law banning the use of 
contraceptives cannot stand). 
116 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454–55 (“[Massachusetts] could not, consistently with the Equal 
Protection Clause, outlaw distribution to unmarried but not to married persons.”). 
117 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480, 485–86 (striking down a Connecticut statute, “which[] in 
forbidding the use of contraceptives,” had a “maximum destructive impact upon” a relationship lying 
with the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional rights). 
118 See, e.g., id. at 505 (White, J., concurring) (“There is no serious contention that Connecticut 
thinks the use of artificial or external methods of contraception immoral or unwise in itself, or that the 
anti-use statute is founded upon any policy of promoting population expansion. Rather, the statute is 
said to serve the State’s policy against all forms of promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships, be they 
premarital or extramarital, concededly a permissible and legitimate legislative goal.”). 
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access to single people violated constitutional equality guarantees.119 The 
Court also found it “unreasonable to assume that Massachusetts has 
prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as punishment for 
fornication,”120 and questioned “the assumption that the fear of pregnancy 
operates as a deterrent to fornication.”121    
III. THE MODERN REVIVAL OF COMSTOCKERY—CONTEMPORARY          
MODES OF REASONING AGAINST CONTRACEPTION 
The nineteenth and early twentieth century view that contraceptive use 
leads to immoral behavior, i.e., non-procreative sex, receded from the 
public sphere after Griswold and Eisenstadt but reemerged publicly with 
full force in the beginning of the twenty-first century. Perhaps most 
brazenly, advocates for contraceptive access were accused of being sluts on 
air by a prominent right-wing talk radio host during the 2012 Presidential 
campaign,122 and were described as women whose libidos were “out of 
control” by a former Governor and Presidential candidate during debates 
over expanded access to contraception included in the Affordable Care 
Act, setting off a media frenzy both times.123 In response to news that a 
program through the Colorado Family Planning Initiative offering 30,000 
contraceptive implants or intrauterine devices (IUDs) at low or no cost to 
low-income women at sixty-eight family-planning clinics across Colorado 
had lowered teen birth rates 40%, the Colorado Right to Life spokesman 
objected that offering contraception to teens sends the message that you 
can “have all the sex you want. . . . When you teach children that they’re 
animals—that they have evolved from pigs and dogs and apes—then they 
act like animals.”124  
In reviving the claim that access to contraceptives increases immoral 
                                                                                                                          
119 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 454–55 (“[Massachusetts] could not, consistently with the Equal 
Protection Clause, outlaw distribution to unmarried but not to married persons . . . If the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear 
or beget a child.”). 
120 Id. at 448.  
121 Id. at 449. 
122 Jack Mirkinson, Rush Limbaugh: Sandra Fluke, Woman Denied Right to Speak at 
Contraception Hearing a ‘Slut’, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 30, 2012, 5:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/29/rush-limbaugh-sandra-fluke-slut_n_1311640.html.  
123 Aaron Blake, Huckabee: Dems Think Women Can’t Control Their Libido, WASH. POST (Jan. 
23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/01/23/huckabee-dems-think-
women-cant-control-their-libido/; Abby D. Phillip, Mike Huckabee: Dems Think Women  Can’t 
‘Control their Libido’ Without Government, ABC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2014, 4:58 PM),  
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/01/mike-huckabee-dems-think-women-cant-control-their-
libido-without-government/. 
124 Gail Sullivan, How Colorado’s Teen Birthrate Dropped 40% in Four Years, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/08/12/how-colorados-
teen-birthrate-dropped-40-in-four-years/ (quoting Colorado Right to Life spokesperson Bob Enyart). 
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behavior, opponents appear to be intentionally modeling their efforts on 
those of nineteenth century opponents of contraception and abortion, 
especially Anthony Comstock. Allan Carlson, President of The Howard 
Center for Family, Religion, and Society, draws on this nineteenth century 
history in an article125 that appears as a sort of strategic blueprint for 
contemporary opponents of contraceptives. The article celebrates the role 
of Evangelical Protestants in general, and Anthony Comstock in particular, 
in enacting the “only effective laws suppressing birth control information 
and devices.”126 According to Carlson, opposition to contraception for 
Anthony Comstock was grounded in “a natural law that encompassed 
human sexuality.”127 Carlson grounds Comstock’s success in two 
strategies. The first was connecting contraceptives and abortion to 
obscenity and immorality. As reported by Carlson, Comstock argued to his 
backers that the “availability of contraceptives encouraged immoral 
behavior,” i.e., non-procreative sex, and that obscene literature was: 
“[C]unningly calculated to inflame the passions and lead the 
victims from one step of vice to another, ending in utmost 
lust. [With] victims . . . polluted in thought and 
imagination . . . the authors of their debasement [then] 
present a variety of implements by the aid of which they 
promise them the practice of licentiousness without its direful 
consequences. [Birth control allowed the despoilers of the 
innocents] to minister to the most degrading 
appetites . . . [and] conceal the crime which may be 
                                                                                                                          
125 The article, Carlson, supra note 27, is published by The Howard Center for Family, Religion, 
and Society. The Howard Center “believes the natural family is the fundamental unit of society; that it 
is the basis of all healthy and progressive civilizations.” The Natural Family, HOWARD CENTER FOR 
FAM., RELIGION & SOC’Y (Feb. 10, 2007), http://profam.org/THC/xthc_tnf.htm. The natural family, 
the Center declares, “is the fundamental social unit, inscribed in human nature, and centered around the 
voluntary union of a man and a woman in a lifelong covenant of marriage, for the purposes of: 
satisfying the longings of the human heart to give and receive love; 
welcoming and ensuring the full physical and emotional development of children; 
sharing a home that serves as the center for social, educational, economic, and 
spiritual life; 
building strong bonds among the generations to pass on a way of life that has 
transcendent meaning; 
extending a hand of compassion to individuals and households whose circumstances 
fall short of these ideals.”  
Id.    
126 Carlson, supra note 27. Anthony Comstock is described as “the apotheosis, the fine flower of 
Puritanism,” “a symbol, a caricature, a physical embodiment of the entire cause of purity and 
puritanism.” Id. 
127 Id.  
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contemplated or per chance already committed.”128 
In addition to embracing the notion that non-procreative sex is 
immoral, Carlson also celebrates Comstock’s second successful strategy—
linking abortion and contraception together because of “the common 
danger they posed to women’s health.”129 Carlson points out that Comstock 
had the benefit of being supported by the nineteenth century physicians, 
discussed previously in Part II.A, who believed that contraception caused 
“uterine disease.”130 Carlson quotes physicians involved in the campaign to 
criminalize abortion and contraception who believed that any attempt to 
prevent pregnancy, even by a married couple, other than by complete 
abstinence from intercourse “are alike disastrous to a woman’s mental, 
moral, and physical well-being,”131  and that “‘[l]ocal congestions, nervous 
affections and debilities are the direct and indisputable results of coitus 
imperfecti.”132 In their view, intercourse using contraception was “rendered 
but a species of self-abuse,” that is, masturbation.133   
Carlson’s point is not that these pre-modern “medical” claims are 
valid, though he is unconcerned that the views were incorrect. The claim 
that contraception harms health for Comstock in the nineteenth century, as 
well as for Carlson today in the twentieth-first century, is based in the view 
that a sex act for pleasure—whether masturbation, sex with a prostitute, or 
sex in marriage for non-procreative purposes—is an immoral act, a seed 
spilled without purpose, a “conjugal onanism.”134 Its harm to health comes 
from its immorality; linking these claims to a scientific discourse was a 
                                                                                                                          
128 Id. (quoting The New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, Second Report (1876) in 
NICOLA BEISEL, IMPERILED INNOCENTS:  ANTHONY COMSTOCK AND FAMILY REPRODUCTION IN 
VICTORIAN AMERICA 40–41 (1997) (quoting Comstock) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. (citing D. Humphreys Storer, Two Frequent Causes of Uterine Disease, 6 J. 
GYNAECOLOGICAL SOC’Y BOS. 194, 195–203 (1855)); see supra Part II.A (discussing Comstock and 
the alleged connection between obscene materials, contraception, and illness).  
131 Carlson, supra note 27 (quoting Horatio Robinson Storer, The Criminality and Physical Evils 
of Forced Abortions, 16 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N 741 (1866)); see also id. (quoting a 
physician stating that “‘[t]he evil results of the whole system of avoiding offspring in the married state 
are so palpable and so gross, that one can scarcely find language strong enough to denounce it in 
suitable manner’” and citing the “‘catalogue of the female diseases’ caused by these practices”); see 
supra Part II.A (“As evidenced by the Congressional debates over the Comstock Act, these nineteenth 
century opponents of contraception were fueled by the belief that illness was punishment for immoral 
sexual behavior.”). 
132 Carlson, supra note 27. 
133 Id. (quoting AUGUSTUS K. GARDNER, CONJUGAL SINS AGAINST THE LAWS OF LIFE AND 
HEALTH 230–31 (1870)). 
134 Id. (citing L.F.E. BERGERET, THE PREVENTIVE OBSTACLE, OR CONJUGAL ONANISM:  THE 
DANGERS AND INCONVENIENCES TO THE INDIVIDUAL, TO THE FAMILY, AND TO SOCIETY, OF FRAUDS IN 
THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE GENERATIVE FUNCTIONS 6 (P.  DeMarmon trans., 1870)). (concluding 
that “Genesiac frauds [contraception] may provoke in [the woman] diseases of the genital organ, from 
simple inflammation to the most serious degenerations.”) (emphasis added)). 
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way to validate the claims to the mainstream.  His point is that this linkage 
of contraception and abortion to immorality and illness—supported by the 
pre-modern views of some anti-contraceptive crusaders at the time—was 
successful.  
A debate in the on-line magazine Public Discourse provides further 
insight into contemporary opposition to contraception.135 In those pages, 
social conservatives have been remarkably transparent about their hostility 
to contraceptive use and about their view that non-procreative sex is 
“immoral,” even when between married couples.136 Scholars advocating a 
“natural law” approach,137 such as John Finnis and Robert George, believe 
that all forms of non-procreative sex, from sex between persons of the 
same sex, to masturbation, fornication, adultery and bestiality, are equally 
immoral, because they share the same “one morally disqualifying 
feature.”138 The “truly morally significant thing” about all these non-
procreative forms of sex, according to Finnis and George, is that, “in 
diverse forms, they involve disrespect for the basic good of marriage.”139 
 As socially conservative scholars debate the ethics of sex,140 often in 
the on-line pages of Public Discourse, they express an anxiety about the 
position of religion as “belief” rather than “truth,” about the ability of their 
moral beliefs to convince, and about the salience of their ethics to the 
younger generation and the rise in what one scholar calls “sexualityism.”141 
For example, Gerry Bradley decries the statement of an English Lord 
(aptly named Lord Justice Laws) who declared, in denying a religious 
                                                                                                                          
135 This opposition is part of what have been called the “conscience wars.”  See generally Doug 
NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and 
Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015). 
136 See, e.g., John Finnis, Robert P. George, Natural Law and the Unity and Truth of Sexual 
Ethics: A Reply to Gary Gutting, at 3 PUBLIC DISCOURSE, http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com 
/2015/03/14635/?utm_source=The+Witherspoon+Institute&utm_campaign=7523d98a78-
RSS_EMAIL_CAMPAIGN&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_15ce6af37b-7523d98a78-84111329 
137 Id. (arguing that “Catholic sexual ethics are as fully reasonable today as they were in the time 
of St Paul. In fact, the natural law understanding of human fulfillment is inherently intelligible even 
without a theistic framework.”). 
138 Id. (“[I]f people are willing to perform a sex act that fails to embody permanent commitment, 
or a bond that is procreative in type (whether or not it is, or can in the circumstances be, procreative in 
effect), they disable themselves from willing in such a way that their sexual congress can actualize and 
express the good of marriage, which is inherently permanent and procreative in type.”). Finnis and 
George are careful to point out that although all these forms of non-procreative sex share the same 
“morally disqualifying feature,” “[bestiality] is more degrading than the others, of course, in expressing 
an equality between persons and beasts; these kinds of act aren’t alike in every morally significant 
respect and degree—the point is just that there is one morally disqualifying feature they all share.”  Id.   
139 Id. (“only acts of spouses that fulfill the behavioral conditions of procreation have validly 
consummated marriage—and they do that whether or not the non-behavioral conditions of procreation 
happen to obtain. In short, only such sex acts are marital.”). 
140 For now, I leave to others the efforts to puzzle about how masturbation or non-procreative sex 
between a married heterosexual couple, or any sex other than adultery in relation to the adulterer’s own 
marriage is showing disrespect for the basic good of marriage. 
141 Id. (defining sexualityism as “a commitment to uncommitted, unencumbered, inconsequential 
sex”). 
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exemption to a relationship counselor who would not endorse the sexual 
activities of same-sex couples, that any exemption would be 
“unprincipled” because it would not “advance the general good on 
objective grounds, but . . . give effect to the force of subjective opinion.”142  
As Bradley complains:  
 
How so?  [Justice] Laws asserted that it “must be so, since in 
the eyes of everyone save the believer religious faith is 
necessarily subjective, being incommunicable by any kind of 
proof or evidence. It may of course be true; but the 
ascertainment of such a truth lies beyond the means by 
which laws are made in a reasonable society.” Against the 
demands of “equal sexual liberty” . . . solicitude for the 
opaque commitments of the religious subject count for 
nothing.143 
 
If their moral beliefs no longer hold the power of “truth,” a new source of 
truth must be marshaled, and that, it is suggested, is scientific truth. As 
scholar Helen Alvaré proclaims, “I propose to examine th[e] ideology [of 
equal sexual liberty], not only from a woman’s perspective, but also from 
the best scientific evidence we can currently lay our hands on.”144 Thus, the 
decision to reason through science, to muster the best science “we can lay 
our hands on” in support of a moral claim against contraception emerges as 
a strategic and practical decision made because of a concern that moral 
arguments will no longer persuade on their own. 
Adopting this blueprint, the Hobby Lobby amicus brief filed on behalf 
of “Women Speak for Themselves,”145 and the article on which the brief 
appears to have been based,146 also bear a remarkable resemblance to 
Carlson’s Comstock strategy. Contraception is linked directly with 
abortion, and opposition to increased access to contraceptives is based in 
part, as it was in the nineteenth century, on the claim that contraceptive use 
will make women sick.  Styled as a defensive claim—specifically a claim 
that government tyranny forces conscientious objectors to be complicit in 
sin—this form of opposition to contraception is designed to appeal both to 
libertarians, anarchists and other government skeptics who oppose 
government overreach no matter their views on contraception itself, as well 
                                                                                                                          
142 Gerard V. Bradley, What’s Behind the HHS Mandate, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (June 5, 2012), 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/06/5562/. 
143 Id. 
144 Helen Alvaré, The White House and Sexualityism, supra note 26 (“I propose to examine th[e] 
ideology [of equal sexual liberty], not only from a woman’s perspective, but also from the best 
scientific evidence we can currently lay our hands on.”). 
145 Brief of Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3. 
146 Alvaré, supra note 1. 
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as to social conservatives who champion a normative view in which sexual 
intercourse takes place only between heterosexual married couples intent 
on procreation.  
While these opponents of contraception believe in the immorality of 
contraceptive use, they attempt to efface the morality claims by arguing in 
the language of science and medicine (1) that contraceptives are harmful to 
women’s physical health, and (2) that some hormonal contraceptives are 
abortifacients—both of which are contradicted by scientific and medical 
knowledge.  The difference between these health claims based on science 
and the former health claims based on morals is that we can test them.147 
By every measure of objective scrutiny, these claims lack scientific basis, 
and are just the latest version of the idea that sex for pleasure—not for 
procreative purposes—is immoral, and that this immoral act will make you 
sick.148 
                                                                                                                          
147 Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 
1652 (1998) (“When moral claims are . . . defended as functional—a space is created for moral 
criticism based on empirical investigation. In that situation we can employ the moral premises of the 
culture whose morality is at issue, and reasoning from common premises reach a conclusion that our 
local interlocutor may be forced as a matter of logic to accept (if he is logical).”); see also RICHARD A. 
POSNER, SEX AND REASON 220–40 (1992) (“this kind of instrumental criticism of moral codes, 
specifically codes of sexual morality”). 
148 Another version of the claim is seen in the abortion context, where opponents of abortion have 
argued, despite overwhelming scientific evidence to the contrary, that abortion causes breast cancer and 
mental health harms. A woman who decides not to carry a pregnancy to term must be making herself 
sick, these advocates believe, because it is so against her very nature. See, e.g., Report of the South 
Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion, LIBERTY COUNS. 41, 52 (2005), http://www.lc.org/attachments 
/SD_abortion_rpt.pdf (listing “negative effects of abortion” including anxiety, psychological numbing, 
depression, and suicidal ideation, and explaining that “attachment between mother and child begins 
most immediately after conception and the basis of maternal attachment is both psychological and 
physical, and this process, and the natural protective urges of maternal attachment, often form 
irrespective of whether the pregnancy was intended or wanted”); but cf. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 
124, 183 n.7 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (listing studies in support of the proposition that the 
weight of scientific evidence does not comport “with the idea that having an abortion is any more 
dangerous to a woman’s long-term mental health than delivering and parenting a child that she did not 
intend to have”); Fact Sheet: Abortion, Miscarriage, and Breast Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST. 
(Jan. 12, 2010), http:// www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/abortion-miscarriage (“In February 
2003, the National Cancer Institute (NCI) convened a workshop of over 100 of the world’s leading 
experts who study pregnancy and breast cancer risk. . . . They concluded that having an abortion or 
miscarriage does not increase a woman’s subsequent risk of developing breast cancer.”); Report of the 
APA Task Force on Mental Health and Abortion, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N 4 (2008), 
http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/abortion/mental-health.pdf (noting that evidence indicates that 
the relative risk of mental health problems due to an abortion is similar to the risk associated with an 
unplanned pregnancy but that risk increases in certain circumstances). See also MKB Mgm’t Corp. v. 
Burdick, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1062 (D.N.D. 2014) (explaining that the government has an interest in 
preventing pre-viability abortions to “protect[] the physical and mental health of women who may seek 
to procure an abortion”); Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 7, at 1688 (discussing reliance on 
claims that abortion harms women to support abortion restrictions). 
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IV.  CONTRACEPTIVES SAVE WOMEN’S LIVES, AND                                     
BENEFIT THE HEALTH OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN. 
The overwhelming global medical consensus is that contraceptives 
improve women’s health and lives. Government bodies under both 
Republican149 and Democratic Administrations and a wide range of 
private-sector experts, such as the American Medical Association and the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, have long 
recognized that contraceptive services are a safe, vital, and effective 
component of preventive and public health care.150 As the most 
authoritative text on contraceptives states: “In general contraceptives pose 
few serious health risks to users . . . [and] the use of contraceptive methods 
is generally far safer than pregnancy.”151 It is indisputable that 
contraception allows individual women who are sexually active to control 
their reproductive lives safely by choosing whether to vastly reduce their 
risk of pregnancy to near zero.152   
Despite the overwhelming support for contraceptive use among 
medical authorities worldwide, opponents of contraception today have 
begun to follow the lead of their nineteenth century counterparts,153 
claiming that contraceptives are bad for women’s health.154 These bad for 
health claims have been made most prominently in an amicus brief155 filed 
in the Hobby Lobby156 litigation.  The brief criticizes the federal 
government’s brief in the case as well as the Institute of Medicine 
Report157 (IOM Report) that recommended that contraceptives be included 
                                                                                                                          
149 See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions 
About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2052–71 (2011) (discussing the realignment of the Republican 
party on abortion). 
150 Adam Sonfield, The Case for Insurance Coverage of Contraceptive Services And Supplies 
Without Cost-Sharing, 14 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Winter 2011, at 7, 7–9 (2011). 
151 ROBERT A. HATCHER ET AL., CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 61 (20th rev. ed. 2011). 
152 For efficacy rates of various contraceptives, see U.S. Medical Eligibility Criteria, supra note 
39, at 5. 
153 Notably, although their claims are focused on hormonal contraceptives, the opponents do not 
recommend the use of the presumably safe “barrier” methods (condoms and diaphragms) but instead 
advocate sexual abstinence or the rhythm method—even within marriage—as the alternative for 
women who do not desire pregnancy and childbirth. See Alvaré, supra note 1, at 382 (discussing the 
Catholic religion’s “refusal to facilitate access to contraception”). In this way, the opponents reveal that 
underlying their critique of contraceptives is the fundamental moral belief—one shared with Anthony 
Comstock—that any interference with the possibility of procreation during intercourse is itself 
immoral. 
154 See, e.g., id. at 412 (“[T]here is additional evidence that greater use of contraception . . . can 
harm women’s health.”). 
155  Brief of Amicus Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3, at 33–36. 
156 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
157 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE 
GAP, supra note 32 (recommending that contraceptive services be provided at no cost as part of the 
Affordable Care Act, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 424 
(2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code)). 
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at no cost as part of the preventive health care package required under the 
Affordable Care Act.158 The brief claims that the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services and its IOM Report “does not devote 
sufficient attention to the possibility that increasing access to contraception 
might directly harm women’s health.”159 The brief goes on to claim that 
hormonal contraceptives have cardiovascular risks, cause cancer, and 
increase the risk of contracting HIV.160 It also attempts to undermine the 
IOM Report’s findings that contraceptives (1) are good for women because 
they reduce unintended pregnancies, and therefore abortions,161 and (2) are 
good for children both because they increase the spacing between births 
which results in healthier birth outcomes,162 and increase the proportion of 
children born who are wanted.163 Some of the claims made in the amicus 
brief are simply incorrect; others nonsensical. In what follows, I refute 
these health claims.    
A.  Contraindications and the Medical Eligibility Criteria 
The claim made by the amicus brief that contraceptives harm women’s 
health appears to be based primarily on concerns about women for whom 
the use of hormonal contraceptives carries higher-risks than for most 
women.164 For example, opponents harp on the idea that hormonal 
contraceptives may be contraindicated for some women who smoke,165 as 
if women will be prescribed contraceptives without regard to their risk 
factors, and as if the fact that hormonal contraceptives are not appropriate 
for some women makes them inappropriate for all women. They also 
ignore the fact that pregnancy is usually far more dangerous than hormonal 
contraceptives for women whose medical conditions or health histories 
                                                                                                                          
158 Brief of Amicus Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3, at 4–5.  
159 Brief of Amicus Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3, at 33. The brief argues 
that the regulations do not serve a sufficiently compelling state interest to defeat the plaintiffs’ claims 
that the regulations violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Id. at 4–10. After 
assuming without deciding that the regulations served a compelling state interest, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2759, the Court then held that the government did not meet its burden under RFRA of 
establishing that the regulations were narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id. at 2781–82. Justice 
Kennedy wrote separately to stress that “[i]t is important to confirm that a premise of the Court’s 
opinion is its assumption that the HHS regulation here at issue furthers a legitimate and compelling 
interest in the health of female employees,” which could indicate that he believes the interest is 
compelling. Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring). However, this remains unclear. 
160 Brief of Amicus Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3, at 35–36. 
161 Id. at 22–31. 
162 Id. at 11–14. 
163 See id. at 22–29 (arguing that HHS’s claim that increased contraceptive use reduces rates of 
unintended pregnancy is not borne out by the evidence).  
164 Id. at 33–37. 
165 See Alvaré, supra note 1, at 417 (“[A]s of 2008, over 18% of American women smoke . . . . 
This is a large cohort of women who might both receive free hormonal contraception as a consequence 
of the . . . Mandate, while being admittedly quite susceptible to harms from hormonal contraceptives.”). 
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counsel against the use of hormonal contraceptives.166 If hormonal 
contraceptives carry unacceptable risks for individual woman,167 other 
methods such as barrier methods are an option. Rather than recommending 
that these women use non-hormonal contraceptives, however, opponents of 
contraception counsel only sexual abstinence.168  
Like other medical providers, family planning providers take into 
consideration the risks of treatment for an individual patient, as compared 
to alternative treatments or the option of no treatment. To optimize and 
improve uniformity in contraceptive prescribing, the World Health 
Organization created “medical eligibility criteria,” evidence-based 
guidance on the safety of contraceptive method use for women and men 
worldwide who have specific characteristics and medical conditions.169  
The World Health Organization used a “consensus process” involving a 
group of “international family planning experts” who reviewed the best 
medical evidence available globally.170 Experts report that in the absence 
of these guidelines, “[p]ast experience suggests that . . . unnecessary 
restrictions to contraceptive access may be imposed.”171  
First published in 1996, the World Health Organization Medical 
Eligibility Criteria for Contraceptive Use is now in its fourth edition,172 and 
was recently adapted for U.S. providers by the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention.173 The U.S. Medical Eligibility Criteria for Contraceptive 
Use, 2010174 classifies medical conditions that affect eligibility for 
different types of contraception into four numeric categories as follows: 
Category 1. A condition for which there is no restriction for 
the use of the contraceptive method.  
Category 2. A condition for which the advantages of using 
                                                                                                                          
166 See supra Part IV.B.1; see also HATCHER ET AL., supra note 151, at 61 (“[T]he use of 
contraceptive methods is generally far safer than pregnancy.”). 
167 See HATCHER ET AL., supra note 151, at 61–63 (noting that while “[i]n general, contraceptives 
pose few serious health risks,” some have been linked to higher risks of cardiovascular disease and 
some types of cancer).  
168 See Alvaré, supra note 1, at 435 (“It should only be remarked here that the churches opposing 
the Mandate hold, and teach women and men to maintain, an understanding of the sacredness of sexual 
intercourse, and its intrinsic connection with the procreating of new, vulnerable, human life.”).  
169 See U.S. Medical Eligibility Criteria, supra note 39, at 1. 
170 See HATCHER ET AL., supra note 151, at 75–76  
171 Id. at 75 (discussing need for continual updating of medical eligibility criteria to keep up with 
new scientific evidence). 
172 Id.; see also U.S. Medical Eligibility Criteria, supra note 39, at 1–2 (discussing process for 
development of criteria). 
173 Id. at 1–2. The CDC MEC included changes taking new scientific evidence into account. Id. at 
2.   
174 See U.S. Medical Eligibility Criteria, supra note 39, at 1–2 (containing recommendations for 
health-care providers for the safe use of contraceptive methods by women and men with various 
characteristics and medical conditions). 
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the method generally outweigh the theoretical or proven 
risks. (The method can generally be used, but careful follow-
up may be required.) 
Category 3. A condition for which the theoretical or proven 
risks usually outweigh the advantages of using the 
method. . . . Provision of a . . . method to a woman with 
a . . . Category 3 [condition] requires careful clinical 
judgment and access to clinical services. The severity of the 
condition and the availability, practicality, and acceptability 
of alternative methods should be taken into account. 
Category 4. A condition that represents an unacceptable 
health risk if the contraceptive method is used.175 
Following the eligibility criteria, family planning providers in the U.S. 
take into account an individual patient’s particular circumstances,176 and 
(1) determine whether this individual patient has a condition for which 
certain contraceptives are contraindicated; and (2) compare the risk of 
treatment compared to alternative treatments or no treatment. Physicians 
take answers to these questions and additional elements such as 
effectiveness, availability (including accessibility and affordability), and 
acceptability into account when making recommendations to patients.177 
As the textbook Contraceptive Technology notes, these “[e]vidence-based 
guidelines regarding which women are medically eligible for contraceptive 
methods will help to assure that women are not exposed to inappropriate 
risks, while at the same time not denied access to methods that are 
medically appropriate.”178 Throughout all counseling, “[v]oluntary 
informed choice of contraception methods is an essential guiding 
principle.”179 A review of specific risks follows. 
B.  Benefits and Risks of Contraceptives to Women’s Health 
Anti-contraception opponents ignore that hormonal contraceptives 
benefit women’s health by reducing the risks to all women of some serious 
conditions, including protection against some cancers, and that they are far 
                                                                                                                          
175  HATCHER ET AL., supra note 151, at 77–78. 
176 See id. at 76 (“[U.S. Medical Eligibility Criteria] recommendations are meant to serve as a 
source of general clinical guidance. Health care providers should always consider the individual 
clinical circumstances of each person seeking family planning services.”). 
177 Id. at 80; see id. at 46 (“Because most people will use a variety of contraceptive methods 
throughout their lives, they should be knowledgeable about various contraceptive methods. The 
patient’s choice of a contraceptive method depends on several major factors: efficacy, safety, cost, 
noncontraceptive benefits, and personal considerations.”).  
178 Id. at 75.   
179 Id. at 80.   
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safer than the alternative for sexually active women—the alternative being 
pregnancy.180 There are risks, however, that must always be taken into 
account. Here I consider the risks of death, cancer, and cardiovascular 
disease. 
1.  Risk of Death from Pregnancy Versus Hormonal Contraception 
The risk of death from pregnancy in the United States is 1 in 6,900,181 
while the risk of death from using combined oral contraceptives is as 
follows: 
nonsmokers aged 15-34   1 in 1,667,000 
nonsmokers aged 35-54   1 in 33,300 
smokers aged 15-34  1 in 57,800 
smokers aged 35-54  1 in 5,200182 
Patients who are properly informed of these risks can choose whether to 
use contraceptives, and if they desire to use contraceptives, which 
contraceptives to use.   
2.  Impact on Cancer Risks 
Opponents falsely claim that contraceptive pills cause cancer,183  citing 
primarily184 to the inclusion of estrogen-progestogen oral contraceptives, 
also known as combined oral contraceptives or COCs, on a list of “known 
                                                                                                                          
180 Id. at 61–68; Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 39,870, 39,872 (July 2, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pts. 2510, 2590, 45 
C.F.R. pts. 147, 156) (citing INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING 
THE GAPS 107 (2011)). 
181  Id. at 62 (citing Cynthia Berg et al., Pregnancy-Related Mortality in the United States, 1998 to 
2005, 116 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1302, 1302 (2010)). 
182 Id. (citing Pamela Schwingl et al., Estimates of the Risk of Cardiovascular Death Attributable 
to Low-Dose Oral Contraceptives in the United States, 180 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 241, 
241–49 (1999)). 
183 Brief of Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3, at 33–36. 
184 The brief also cites a World Health Organization document without mentioning that the 
document states (1) that “the use of COCs modifies slightly the risk of cancer, increasing it in some 
sites (cervix, breast, liver), decreasing it in others (endometrium, ovary),” (2) that some of the data 
showing increased risk “refer to older higher-dose COC preparations,” and (3) that WHO committees 
that create evidence-based family planning guidelines based on regular reviews of the safety of COCs 
“have determined that for most healthy women, the health benefits [of COCs] clearly exceed the health 
risks.” See id. at 36 n.157 (emphasis added) (citing WORLD HEALTH ORG., STATEMENT: 
CARCINOGENICITY OF COMBINED HORMONAL CONTRACEPTIVES AND COMBINED MENOPAUSAL 
TREATMENT 1 (2005), available at http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/ageing/cocs_hrt_ 
statement.pdf). Finally, the brief cites to a paper examining breast cancer risk in women with one of the 
breast cancer genes, known as BRCA-1 or BRCA-2. See id. (citing Steven A. Narod et al., Oral 
Contraceptives and the Risk of Breast Cancer in BRCA1 and BRCA2 Mutation Carriers, 94 J. NAT’L 
CANCER INST. 1773, 1773 (2002) (stating that for women with one of these genes or with a family 
history of breast cancer, hormonal contraceptives may indeed be contraindicated)).  
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carcinogens” published by the American Cancer Society.185 The brief fails 
to disclose that this list, which also includes “alcoholic beverages,” 
includes substances that are known to cause cancer under certain 
circumstances.186 As the American Cancer Society emphasizes in a section 
entitled “Some important points about the IARC and NTP lists here,” “[t]he 
lists themselves say nothing about how likely it is that an agent will cause 
cancer,” and the likelihood of an agent causing cancer may be based on the 
amount and type of exposure.187 Indeed, the society states that “[e]ven if a 
substance or exposure is known or suspected to cause cancer, this does not 
necessarily mean that it can or should be avoided at all costs,” and refers 
specifically to “estrogen,” a “known carcinogen that occurs naturally in the 
body.”188   
In fact, the best research shows that overall, the net effect of COC use 
on cancer is “negligible.”189 COCs actually protect users against cancers of 
the endometrium and ovary,190 and may also protect against colorectal and 
uterine cancers.191 The opposition completely ignores the most recent 
studies—large, prospective cohort trials in the United States and United 
Kingdom—both of which found no association between current or former 
use of combined oral contraceptives, and an increased risk of diagnosis of 
breast cancer.192 As the authors of one of the newer studies noted, an older 
study finding an association between the use of COCs and an increased 
risk of breast cancer in young women was outdated.193 The old study had 
pooled data from fifty-four epidemiologic studies conducted over the past 
                                                                                                                          
185 Brief of Amicus Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3, at 36 (citing Known and 
Probable Human Carcinogens, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancercauses 
/othercarcinogens/generalinformationaboutcarcinogens/known-and-probable-human-carcinogens (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2015)). 
186 Known and Probable Human Carcinogens, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/cancer 
/cancercauses/othercarcinogens/generalinformationaboutcarcinogens/known-and-probable-human-
carcinogens (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). 
187 Id. (“As noted above, the type and extent of exposure to a substance may also play a role. You 
should consider the actual amount of increased risk when deciding if you should limit or avoid an 
exposure.”). 
188 Id. 
189 HATCHER ET AL., supra note 151, at 63. 
190 Id. at 62–63 (citing Ronald Burkman et al., Safety Concerns and Health Benefits Associated 
with Oral Contraception, 190 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY S5, S8 (2004)). 
191 Id. (citing Philip C. Hannaford et al., Mortality Among Contraceptive Pill Users: Cohort 
Evidence from Royal College of General Practitioners’ Oral Contraception Study, 340 BRIT. MED. J. 
c927, c927 (2010) (reporting that a recent study found that the risk of death for colorectal, uterine, and 
ovarian cancer is lower among women who had used COCs than those who had never used COCs)).   
192 Id. at 63 (citing Philip C. Hannaford et al., Cancer Risk Among Users of Oral Contraceptives:  
Cohort Data from the Royal College of General Practitioners’ Oral Contraception Study, 335 BRIT. 
MED. J. 651, 651 (2007); Polly A. Marchbanks et al., Oral Contraceptives and the Risk of Breast 
Cancer, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2025, 2025 (2002)). 
193 Id. (citing Ronald Burkman et al., Safety Concerns and Health Benefits Associated with Oral 
Contraception, 190 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY S5 (2004)).   
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twenty-five years, and new data was needed “now that larger numbers of 
women who took oral contraceptives early in their reproductive years 
are reaching the age at which the risk of breast cancer is highest.”194 In 
response, scientists designed a population based case-control study, the 
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development Women’s 
Contraceptive and   Reproductive   Experiences   (Women’s CARE) 
Study, to examine the use of oral contraceptives as a risk factor for 
breast cancer in women who were thirty-five to sixty-four years old and 
in subgroups of women defined according to race, age, presence or 
absence of a family history of breast cancer, and other factors.195 The 
study interviewed approximately 9,000 women, approximately half with 
breast cancer and half without, who were interviewed as controls, and 
determined their relative risks of breast cancer.196 The researchers found 
that “[a]mong women from 35 to 64 years of age, current or former oral 
contraceptive use was not associated with a significantly increased risk of 
breast cancer.”197  
Similarly, a study in the United Kingdom reported in the British 
Medical Journal that included more than a million “woman years” of 
observation accumulated over thirty-six years, found that oral 
contraception was not associated with a significantly increased risk of any 
cancer and that “the estimated overall absolute reduction in risk of any 
cancer among ever users of combined oral contraceptives was 45 per 
100,000 woman years . . . .”198  
Depending on which dataset was examined, our analyses 
suggest  either  a statistically  significant  12% reduced risk 
of any cancer (main dataset) or a more modest, non-
significant, 3% reduction  (general practitioner observation 
dataset). In either case we found no evidence of a 
substantial increased risk of cancer overall. A major 
strength of the study was the ability to include more than a 
million woman years of observation,  accumulated over  36 
years. Virtually  all of the women  in the study  are now 
post-menopausal, of  an  age  when  many  cancers  
become  common.199 
Finally, another three studies have found that COC use has neither a 
                                                                                                                          
194 Marchbanks et al., supra note 192, at 2025. 
195 Id. at 2025–26. 
196 Id. at 2025. 
197 Id. 
198 Hannaford et al., supra note 192, at 653–54. 
199 Id. at 653.  
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harmful nor a beneficial effect on breast cancer mortality.200    
3.  Impact on Cardiovascular Disease 
The opponents’ claim that hormonal contraceptives increase the risks 
of cardiovascular disease, i.e., myocardial infarction (heart attack) and 
stroke, is false as applied to most women.201 Although the use of COCs is 
generally associated with an increased risk of cardiovascular disease 
because it can increase the risk of developing a clot that can cause a heart 
attack or a stroke, there is no increased risk of stroke in nonsmoking 
women under age thirty-five, who use COCs with less than fifty mcg 
estrogen.202 Similarly, women who do not smoke, are not diabetic, and 
have normal blood pressure levels have no increased risk of myocardial 
infarction.203 Finally, the evidence shows that women are at the biggest risk 
of forming a clot that could cause a heart attack or stroke when they are 
pregnant.204 Therefore, any contraceptive that prevents pregnancy 
ultimately decreases the risk of forming a clot.205 
C.  Contraceptives Improve the Health of Children By Allowing Women to 
Increase the Space Between Births. 
There is confusion in both the IOM Report and in the opposition 
Amicus Brief and article between the impact of the intentionality of 
pregnancy on maternal and child health with the impact of birth spacing on 
birth outcomes. I will assume for the sake of argument that neither the 
IOM Report nor the opponents of contraception intended to confuse the 
two. It may be that confusion on the issue is more useful to the opponents 
than it is to the IOM Report, but either way, I aim to end the confusion 
here. In this Article, I separate these two factors that potentially impact 
maternal and child health and discuss what the most recent data shows and 
does not show about each.   
As the IOM Report found, increasing the space between births206—
                                                                                                                          
200 HATCHER ET AL., supra note 151, at 63 (citing Hannaford et al., supra note 192; M. Vessey, et 
al., Factors Affecting Mortality in a Large Cohort Study with Special Reference to Oral Contraceptive 
Use, 82 CONTRACEPTION 221 (2010); P.A. Wingo et al., Oral Contraceptives and the Risk of Death 
from Breast Cancer, 110 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 793 (2007)).  
201 Brief of Amicus Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3, at 35. 
202 Id. 
203 HATCHER ET AL., supra note 151, at 63. 
204 Id. 
205 See id. (discussing how women are at the highest risk of forming a blood clot that could cause 
a heart attack or stroke when they are pregnant). 
206 This should not be confused with the evidence concerning the impact on the health of children 
born of “unintended” pregnancies. Opponents of contraception have tried to undermine the very strong 
evidence that longer pregnancy intervals improve birth outcomes by confusing it with the evidence 
concerning the impact on the health of children born of “unintended” pregnancies. Brief of Amicus 
Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3, at 36. The benefits of reducing unintended 
pregnancies—which I discuss infra at Part IV.D—are significant but differ from the benefits of 
 
 1006 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:971 
which contraception allows—reduces adverse pregnancy outcomes, like 
preterm births, prematurity, and low-birth weight.207 One critic of 
contraceptive use disputes this finding but reveals that her main concern is 
not the health of children who are born, but rather a normative concern that 
the procreative potential of intercourse is being impeded.  She writes, 
“children’s health is not boosted by their being prevented from coming into 
being.”208 Actually, the research establishes that children are healthier 
when there is more space between pregnancies. This same anti-
contraception advocate disputes this fact,,arguing that the papers relied on 
by the IOM Report “claim only to show an ‘associat[ion],’ not causation, 
between shorter pregnancy intervals and low birth weight.”209 This is not 
only incorrect because one of the papers specifically finds causation,210 but 
it is also based on a fundamental and quite shocking misunderstanding of 
the purposes and benefits of quantitative statistical analysis.211   
The purpose of statistical analysis is to determine whether certain 
studied factors are “associated” with certain outcomes and, if so, how 
strong the associations are. To determine the strength of the associations, 
study authors attempt to control for other potential causes, which constitute 
potential confounding factors. The more confounding factors are 
eliminated as potential causes of a given outcome, the likelier it is that the 
studied factor is the cause. As a basic quantitative research text notes, “a 
well-designed quantitative study will allow us not just to look at what 
happens, but to provide an explanation of why it happens as well. The key 
lies in your research design and what variables you collect.”212   
The studies relied on by the IOM Report recommending increased 
access to contraceptives show “associations” of varying strengths that are 
carefully explained.213 Based on the strength of these associations, and by 
                                                                                                                          
increasing pregnancy intervals. 
207 Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39870, 
39872 (July 2, 2013). 
208 Alvaré, supra note 1, at 392. 
209 Alvaré, supra note 1, at 393. 
210 B.P. Zhu, Effect of Interpregnancy Interval on Birth Outcomes: Findings from Three Recent 
US Studies, 89 INT’L J. OF GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS S25, S31 (2005).   
211 I note that while the Amicus Brief’s critique of the IOM Report supporting increased access to 
contraceptives uses these general criticisms of social science methods to attack studies that undermine 
their point of view, the Brief relies on other studies using these same criticized methods, when they find 
data that they believe supports their point of view. E.g., supra Part IV.B.2. While there is a deep and 
extensive literature about debates concerning the use of statistical analyses in social science, the 
opponents’ willingness to rely on the same methods they criticize undermines any presumption that 
they are engaging seriously with these critiques of social science and further undermines the claim that 
contraception harms women. 
212 As Introduction to Quantitative Research explains, the idea that “[w]e can never explain things 
by using quantitative research,” is one of the “common misconceptions” concerning quantitative 
research. DANIEL MUIJS, DOING QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH IN EDUCATION WITH SPSS 9 (2d ed. 2011). 
213 E.g., Agustin Conde-Agudelo et al., Birth Spacing and Risk of Adverse Perinatal Outcomes, A 
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controlling for other possible confounding factors, study authors are able to 
make causal inferences about the hypotheses studied or to provide an 
assessment of the likelihood of causation based on the strength of the 
associations. As a major text in the field states:   
Avoiding causal language when causality is the real subject 
of investigation either renders the research irrelevant or 
permits it to remain undisciplined by the rules of scientific 
inference. Our uncertainty about causal inferences will never 
be eliminated. But this uncertainty should not suggest that we 
avoid attempts at causal inference. Rather we should draw 
causal inferences where they seem appropriate but also 
provide the reader with the best and most honest estimate of 
the uncertainty of that inference.214 
Turning back to the scientific literature relied upon by the IOM Report 
concerning the relationship between birth outcomes and longer intervals 
between pregnancies, one of the three papers cited reports that “there is a 
causal relationship between interpregnancy interval and adverse birth 
outcomes,” and “[t]he optimal interpregnancy interval for preventing 
adverse birth outcomes appeared to be approximately 18–23 months, 
departing from which the risk for adverse birth outcomes increased, 
although the increase was not appreciable unless the interpregnancy 
interval was shorter than 6 months or longer than 5 years.”215 That paper 
reported on three studies that were “conducted in various populations, 
using different study designs, stratified by, and controlling for various 
maternal reproductive risk factors [that] addressed a number of 
methodological limitations regarding previously published studies.”216  
The second and third papers did not claim causation, but did report a 
“significant association” and an “independent association” respectively 
between pregnancy intervals and an increased risk of adverse pregnancy 
outcomes.217 The second paper is a systematic review published in the 
Journal of the American Medical Association using three different meta-
                                                                                                                          
Meta Analysis, 295 JAMA 1809, 1809–23 (2006); Elena Fuentes-Afflick & Nancy A. Hessol, 
Interpregnancy Interval and the Risk of Premature Infants, 95 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 383, 383–
390 (2000); Zhu, supra note 210, at S25–S33. 
214 GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE 
RESEARCH 76 (1994); see also RETHINKING SOCIAL INQUIRY:  DIVERSE TOOLS, SHARED STANDARDS 
184–85 (Henry E. Brady & David Collier eds., 2d ed. 2010) (discussing “causal-process observations”). 
215 Zhu, supra note 210, at S31 (emphasis added).   
216 Id. at S31.   
217 See Conde-Agudelo et al., supra note 213, at 1821 (“birth to conception intervals shorter than 
18 months and longer than 59 months are significantly associated with increased risk of several adverse 
perinatal outcomes, such as preterm birth, LBW, and SGA.”); Fuentes-Afflick & Hessol, supra note 
213, at 388 (“we found that interpregnancy intervals less than 18 months and more than 59 months 
were independently associated with the risk of premature infants”). 
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analytical techniques to pool data from numerous individual studies of the 
relationship between pregnancy intervals and adverse perinatal 
outcomes.218 That paper reports that birth to conception intervals shorter 
than eighteen months and longer than fifty-nine months are “significantly 
associated” with increased risk of several adverse perinatal outcomes, such 
as preterm birth, low birth weight, and fetuses that are small for gestational 
age.219 The study controlled for a number of potential confounding factors 
that had been suggested such as socioeconomic status, unstable lifestyles, 
failure to use health care services, or inadequate use of such services, 
unplanned pregnancies, and other behavioral or psychological 
determinants.220 However, the study reports that “the birth spacing effects 
are not strongly attenuated when socioeconomic and maternal 
characteristics are controlled for suggest[ing] that the effects are not 
caused by these confounding factors,” which importantly include the 
unplanned nature of the pregnancy.221  
The third paper similarly found that “interpregnancy intervals were 
independently associated with the risk of prematurity in [the] study.”222 It 
also reported that two other factors were associated more strongly with the 
risk of premature infants, namely previous premature or small for 
gestational age infant and utilization of prenatal care, both of which were 
consistent with previous studies.223 Thus, the paper identified 
interpregnancy interval as a third strong indicator of adverse pregnancy 
outcomes which, unlike previous indicators of adverse pregnancy 
outcomes, is a potentially modifiable factor. As two papers reporting 
strong associations and eliminating potential confounding factors, they, 
like the first paper,224 provide strong evidence of a causal link. Because 
interpregnancy intervals are a potentially modifiable risk factor for low 
birth weight,225 recommendations that come from these studies support the 
use of family planning to support optimal pregnancy spacing.226   
D.  Impact of Pregnancy Intention on Child and Maternal Health 
The opponents argue that when studying the impact of pregnancy 
intention on health, the failure to account for differing categories of 
intention invalidates study findings as a whole.227 If a pregnancy is 
                                                                                                                          
218 Conde-Agudelo et al., supra note 213, at 1821.   
219 Id.   
220 Id. at 1809, 1821. 
221 Id. at 1821. 
222 Fuentes-Afflick & Hessol, supra note 213, at 388–89. 
223 Id. 
224 See Zhu, supra note 210. 
225 Id. 
226 Fuentes-Afflick & Hessol, supra note 213, at 389; Zhu, supra note 210, at S32. 
227 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Women Speak for Themselves, supra note 3, at 22–23. 
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“unintended,” this can mean either (1) that the woman wants to have a 
child, or another child, in the future but not at the time she gets pregnant, 
or (2) the woman has finished childbearing or does not ever intend to have 
a child.228 As a 2008 literature review explained, most survey instruments 
will refer to the first group as pregnancies that are “mistimed” or “wanted 
later,” and the second group as pregnancies that are “not wanted at all.”229 
Studies often consider these two categories together, underestimating the 
true effect of pregnancies that are “not wanted at all,” and overestimating 
the effect of a pregnancy that is “mistimed” or “wanted later.”230 While it 
would be helpful if future studies separated outcomes based on these 
different categories to assist public health officials in formulating strategies 
to help those impacted most negatively by unintended pregnancy, it does 
not undermine what we do know about unintended pregnancies as a 
group.231 A recent survey of the literature concerning the impact of 
intention on birth outcomes clarifies what current studies do and do not tell 
us about this factor.232       
In a literature review examining the evidence of the impact of intention 
on child and parental health, the authors report that the field is incomplete.  
On the one hand, the authors report a considerable number of studies (often 
conducted in the United States), showing consistently disturbing results on 
prenatal care, breastfeeding, child abuse, maternal health, and abortions.  
These are outcomes that cannot be ignored and that are described in what 
follows.233 On the other hand, the evidence of the impact of intention on 
some child and parental health outcomes is “mixed and . . . limited by an 
insufficient number of studies for some outcomes” and by some 
measurement and analytical concerns.234 For example, for outcomes “such 
as maternal risk behaviors, pregnancy outcomes, and curative care, 
developed country studies failed to find a significant association with 
pregnancy intention[, with] the paucity of studies . . .  preclud[ing] an 
overall assessment of such an impact.”235 The authors call for more studies 
to address these concerns and to increase understanding of the impacts of 
                                                                                                                          
228 Jessica D. Gipson et al., The Effects of Unintended Pregnancy on Infant, Child, and Parental 
Health: A Review of the Literature, 39 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 18, 19 (2008). 
229 Id. at 19–20. 
230 Id. at 19. 
231 See Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Disparities in Rates of Unintended Pregnancy in 
the United States, 1994 and 2001, 38 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 90, 91 (2006) 
(“[C]lassifying all pregnancies ending in abortion as unintended should have minimal impact on our 
calculated rates.”). 
232 Gipson, supra note 228, at 18–19.  
233 Id. at 29–30. 
234 Id. at 29.   
235 Id. at 30.   
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intention on pregnancy outcomes.236  
1. Impact of Pregnancy Intention on Prenatal Care, Breastfeeding, 
Child Abuse, and Maternal Health 
The evidence concerning the impact of whether a pregnancy is 
intended on prenatal care and breastfeeding behavior “is relatively 
consistent, showing a negative effect of unintended pregnancy.”237 Studies 
in developed countries “found more pronounced effects on the timing, 
rather than the frequency, of antenatal care and found persistent negative 
effects on the breastfeeding of children who resulted from unintended 
pregnancies.”238 For example, “[n]early all United States and European 
studies assessing the effect of pregnancy intention on breastfeeding have 
concluded that children who are born from unintended pregnancies are less 
likely to be breastfed or are more likely to be breastfed for a shorter 
duration, compared with children whose birth was intended.”239 Even 
within the same family, children born from unintended pregnancies “were 
significantly less likely to be breastfed, after controlling for other 
sociodemographic characteristics.”240  
Moreover, studies from developed countries suggest a positive 
association between unintended pregnancy and child abuse. In a 
population-based study that analyzed data for 14,256 children from the 
United Kingdom:  
Children . . . who were registered with the child protection 
agency by the age of six . . . were nearly three times more 
likely than others to have resulted from a pregnancy that the 
mother considered to be unintended . . . , after controlling for 
birth weight, child health, developmental problems, and 
reported positive attributes of the child.241 
With regard to a link between unintended childbearing and maternal 
health outcomes, studies have not shown any impact on maternal physical 
health, but a number of studies from developed countries suggest a link 
between unintended childbearing and a significantly increased risk of 
maternal depression, anxiety, and a decline in psychological well-being or 
                                                                                                                          
236 See id. (discussing the need for future studies on the topic to try to pinpoint the causal 
relationship between presence of intent in pregnancy and children’s health outcomes more accurately).  
237 Id. at 30. On the other hand, “[n]o effects were found in the few studies assessing the 
association between pregnancy intention and well-baby care, child immunization, or curative care in 
the United States and Europe.” Id. at 25. 
238 Id. at 30.   
239 Id. at 24.   
240 Id.   
241 Id. at 27.   
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psychosocial conditions.242 As one 1999 study of longitudinal data from 
the National Survey of Families and Households found, “[a]fter controlling 
for maternal characteristics, total number of children in the family, and 
presence in the household of a child aged five to eighteen, mothers who 
had experienced any unwanted births reported higher levels of depression 
and lower levels of happiness.”243 This 1999 study also found that 
“mothers who had experienced unwanted births were more likely to spank 
or slap their children and to have spent less leisure time with them, 
compared with other mothers.”244 While the studies showed that negative 
outcomes were “significantly exacerbated by the mother’s mental health 
status,” more research is needed to control for preexisting mental illness 
and other markers of prior psychosocial well-being before firm 
assessments can be made.245   
As a result of these established negative outcomes, the study authors 
conclude that  
[t]he evidence of the impact of unintended pregnancy on 
abortion-related morbidity and mortality points to the need 
for primary and secondary prevention efforts. Primary 
prevention, through the increased provision and use of 
effective contraceptive methods, can reduce levels of 
unintended pregnancy. In the event of an unintended 
pregnancy, secondary prevention efforts can help to ensure 
safe abortion and postabortion services to prevent ongoing 
illness and death for the estimated 46 million women around 
the world who have abortions each year.246  
2.  Impact of Pregnancy Intention on Abortion 
One of the greatest benefits of contraception is that it reduces the 
number of unintended pregnancies, thereby reducing the number of 
abortions. In 2001, unintended pregnancies accounted for 49% of all 
pregnancies, 3.1 million of a total of 6.4 million pregnancies, or 51 
pregnancies per 1,000 women aged fifteen to forty-four in the United 
States.247 Of these 3.1 million unintended pregnancies, 42%—or 
approximately 20% of all pregnancies—ended in abortions.248 One could 
reduce the proportion of pregnancies that are called “unintended” if that 
                                                                                                                          
242 Id. at 28.   
243 Id.   
244 Id.  
245 Id. at 28, 30. 
246 Id. at 29–30.  
247 Finer & Henshaw, supra note 231, at 90–92, 92 fig.1, 93, 93 tbl.1. In 2001, unintended 
pregnancies accounted for 49% of all pregnancies, a rate virtually unchanged from 1994. Id. at 92. 
248 Id. 
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group were limited to those pregnancies that are “never wanted,” and 
creating a third group of “mistimed/wanted later” pregnancies.  
Presumably the proportion of pregnancies that are “never wanted” that then 
result in abortion is going to be higher than the proportion of pregnancies 
that are “mistimed,” or “wanted later.” The reclassification will not reduce 
the overall proportion of pregnancies that result in abortions, though. 
Contraception that reduces the incidence of pregnancies that are “never 
wanted,” as well as those that are “mistimed” or “wanted later” will.249  
Reduction of the incidence of abortions occurring in this fashion is a 
good thing if you believe in reproductive rights and justice, because the 
reduction of abortions is coming from reduction in the demand for 
abortion, as opposed to coming from cutting off the supply of or restricting 
the ability of women to access abortions.250 This should also be a good 
thing if you are against abortion itself. If your opposition to abortion is, 
however, in part based on the idea that the risk of pregnancy serves as a 
check on, or punishment for, immoral sex—sex outside of marriage, or sex 
between husband and wife undertaken for pleasure alone with as close to 
zero risk of pregnancy as possible—then this is not necessarily so. Instead 
of being viewed as a good that reduces the number of abortions, 
contraceptives are seen as promoting immoral sex and allowing it to go 
unpunished.251  
V.  CONTRACEPTIVES ARE NOT ABORTIFACIENTS 
The opponents of contraception also follow in the footsteps of 
Anthony Comstock by linking contraception to abortion.252 In the twenty-
first century, this linkage is attempted by arguing that some contraceptive 
drugs and devices actually operate as abortifacients and end a 
                                                                                                                          
249 Finer & Henshaw, supra note 231, at 90–92; see also INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE 
SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS, supra note 32, at 105 (2011); John Bongaarts & Charles F. 
Westoff, The Potential Role of Contraception in Reducing Abortion, 31 STUD. IN FAM. PLAN. 193, 200 
(2000) (“The incidence of abortion can be reduced by raising contraceptive prevalence and 
effectiveness.”); Jeffrey F. Peipert et al., Preventing Unintended Pregnancies by Providing No-Cost 
Contraception, 120 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1291, 1291–93, 1295–96 (2012) discussing the 
results of a study conducted on women at risk of unintended pregnancy that showed a decrease in 
abortion rates with women enrolled in the Contraceptive CHOICE Project). 
250 See Bongaarts & Westoff, supra note 249, at 200 (arguing that if contraceptives were more 
accessible to women, the need for abortions due to unintended pregnancies would decrease).  
251 See, e.g., Paul D. O’Callaghan, Pseudosex in Pseudotheology, 4 CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 83, 83–
84, 86–87 (1998) (presenting the argument of John Beaumont that social acceptance of contraceptive 
sex leads to further social acceptance of other forms of immoral sex, such as homosexual intercourse).  
252 See Maryam T. Afif, Comment, Prescription Ethics: Can States Protect Pharmacists Who 
Refuse to Dispense Contraceptive Prescriptions?, 26 PACE L. REV. 243, 244–46 (2005) (explaining the 
history of Anthony Comstock’s crusade against immoral behavior and describing publications that 
promoted the use of birth control and abortions, which led several states to criminalize the use of 
contraceptives and abortions).   
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“pregnancy.”253 The argument relies on two claims, both of which are 
false.  
First, the opponents argue that “pregnancy” occurs as soon as the egg 
is fertilized by the sperm, prior to implantation of the fertilized egg into the 
uterine lining. As shown below, this is contrary to the medical definition of 
pregnancy, not to mention common sense given the significant number of 
fertilized eggs that fail to implant on their own, exiting the body with no 
fanfare, without the use of any contraceptive device. Second, the 
opponents also argue that contraceptive devices have the power to prevent 
implantation of a fertilized egg.  They lodge this accusation against five 
contraceptive methods in the Hobby Lobby litigation.  As I discuss in detail 
below, it has been established conclusively that four of the five 
contraceptive methods cannot prevent implantation of a fertilized egg and 
so cannot terminate a “pregnancy,” even defined in the way the opponents 
define it. The fifth, the copper IUD, could prevent implantation, but only if 
inserted after ovulation, i.e., after the egg has been released from the ovary 
but before it has traveled out of the body.  Notably, despite this proof that 
these four contraceptives can never act to prevent implantation of the 
fertilized egg and so do not “abort” a “pregnancy,” even under the 
incorrect definition of that term used by the opposition, anti-contraception 
advocates have not withdrawn their opposition to these four forms of 
contraception.   
A.  Definition of Pregnancy 
The opposition’s claim that an “abortion” can occur if a fertilized egg 
is prevented from implanting into the uterine lining relies on the contention 
that “pregnancy” begins when the ovum is fertilized by sperm—even 
before the egg has implanted in the uterine lining.  This is an argument 
anti-abortion and anti-contraceptive advocates have used inconsistently in 
the past.254  
One problem with the opposition’s claim is that according to the 
descriptions of pregnancy in obstetrical textbooks written by professional 
organizations of obstetricians and gynecologists in the United States and 
abroad, and by the United States Federal Government, “pregnancy” starts 
                                                                                                                          
253 “Other religious institutions opposed only to abortion were affected by the Mandate’s 
inclusion of ECs and other contraceptives, which, according to the federal government and their 
manufacturers, can act at some times as an abortifacient, i.e., to destroy a human embryo.” Alvaré, 
supra note 1, at 384. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the claimants opposed coverage of four types of 
contraceptives because they believed they were abortifacients. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). 
254 Joerg Dreweke, Contraception Is Not Abortion: The Strategic Campaign of Antiabortion 
Groups to Persuade the Public Otherwise, 17 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Fall 2014, at 14, 14 (noting 
that anti-abortion groups have “selectively embraced the core ‘personhood’ argument—that U.S. policy 
should in some circumstances recognize pregnancy as beginning at fertilization—as a way to 
undermine access to birth control”). 
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only after implantation of an already fertilized egg. For example, the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists notes that a 
“pregnancy is considered to be established only after implantation is 
complete,”255 a process that “can be completed as early as eight days or as 
late as 18 days after fertilization, but [that] usually takes about 14 days.”256 
Indeed, it is only after implantation that a pregnancy test will register as 
positive because of the hormonal changes that occur after implantation.257  
The National Institutes of Health take a similar position. Federal 
regulations governing human subjects research define pregnancy as 
“encompass[ing] the period of time from implantation until delivery.”258 
Part of the reason for this definition is the high number of fertilized eggs 
that fail to implant even without the use of any contraceptives.259 
According to the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 
“between one-third and one-half of all fertilized eggs never fully 
implant.”260   
Opponents dismiss these definitions of pregnancy, attributing the 
definitions to the supposed pro-choice leanings of both the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the federal government.261 
But this ignores that even the Bush Administration, self-defined as 
promoting a “culture of life,”262 adopted rules to implement the Hyde 
Amendment—the federal statute banning federal funding for abortions in 
the Medicaid program263—that defined pregnancy in accordance with the 
medical consensus represented by the American College of Obstetricians 
                                                                                                                          
255 Rachel Benson Gold, supra note 15, at 7, 8 (quoting the American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists’ position). 
256 Id. 
257 It takes two weeks for a urine pregnancy test to become positive. See Allen J. Wilcox, Donna 
Day Baird, & Clarice R. Weinberg, Time of Implantation of the Conceptus and Loss of Pregnancy, 340 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1796, 1797 (1999) (noting that it normally takes eight, nine, or ten days for 
implantation to occur after ovulation). 
258 45 C.F.R. § 46.202(f) (2013). 
259 Gold, supra note 15, at 8 (citing ACOG). 
260 Id. 
261 See CATHY CLEAVER RUSE & ROB SCHWARZWALDER, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
BEST PRO-LIFE ARGUMENTS FOR SECULAR AUDIENCES 2 (2011), available at 
http://downloads.frc.org/EF/EF11J30.pdf (citing ROBERT G. MARSHALL & CHARLES A. DONOVAN, 
BLESSED ARE THE BARREN: THE SOCIAL POLICY OF PLANNED PARENTHOOD 293 (1991) (reporting that 
in 1965, “ACOG stated in its first Terminology Bulletin that ‘Conception is the implantation of a 
fertilized ovum’”)); see also MARSHALL & DONOVAN, BLESSED ARE THE BARREN: THE SOCIAL 
POLICY OF PLANNED PARENTHOOD at 293 (1991) (“[G]iven the political leaning of governmental 
agencies, academic institutions, and the scientific publishing industry it would not be surprising if it 
were correct that ‘the medical community has long been clear: Pregnancy is established when a 
fertilized egg has been implanted in the wall of a woman’s uterus.’” (quoting Gold, supra note 15, at 
7)).  
262 Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Hails Progress Toward ‘Culture of Life’; Limits on Abortion, Stem 
Cell Use Cited, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2005, at A3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
263 Gold, supra note 15, at 7. 
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and Gynecologists.264 Those rules block the use of public funds to pay for 
abortion services for low-income women but make clear that funding is 
available for “drugs or devices to prevent implantation of the fertilized 
ovum,” thus excluding these drugs and devices from the definition of 
abortion.265 These rules, which remain in effect today, say that pregnancy 
“encompasses the period of time from implantation until delivery.”266   
Thus, even if the contraceptives could prevent a fertilized egg from 
implanting, they would not be terminating a “pregnancy”; they would be 
preventing one.267 Opposition to any drug or device that prevents a 
fertilized egg from implanting in a woman’s uterine lining, opposition 
stemming from their belief that a fertilized egg is a “human life” deserving 
of protection, is therefore not opposition to “abortion,” it is by definition 
opposition to a form of contraception.268  
B.  Mechanisms of Action of Emergency Contraception and IUDs 
In response to this claim, one could argue that the important point is  
not whether prevention of implantation by a fertilized egg is termination of 
a “pregnancy,” and thus is considered an “abortion.” Instead, one could 
argue that one is opposed to medicines or devices that prevent a fertilized 
egg from implanting because one believes that the fertilized egg is a 
“human life,” and preventing implantation is immoral in its own right, 
even if one were to call it contraception or prevention of implantation by a 
fertilized egg.  Indeed, one could simply argue that one is opposed to 
certain forms of contraception that had this effect.  This is a perfectly valid 
moral position for someone to hold and has the benefit of honesty, of not 
trying to muddy the waters by playing fast and loose with medical 
terminology.  
The problem with this second argument is that once again the science 
does not support the opposition. The question is whether Emergency 
Contraception and IUDs, which were singled out for attack in the Hobby 
Lobby litigation,269 are effective only because they prevent fertilization in 
                                                                                                                          
264 See id. (noting that the same federal regulations meant to effect the Hyde Amendment 
eventually aligned with the medical community’s consensus that pregnancy begins once implantation 
has commenced). 
265 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
266 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
267 See 45 C.F.R § 46.202(f) (2013) (providing the legal definition of pregnancy as beginning at 
implantation); infra note 269 (explaining that contraceptives cannot act after the embryo is implanted). 
268 Id. 
269 It is undisputed that none of the products clinicians and scientists call contraceptives can act 
after the embryo is implanted in the uterine lining, which is when a pregnancy begins. See Gillian Dean 
& Eleanor Bimla Schwarz, Intrauterine Contraceptives (IUCs), in CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 147, 
150 (Robert A. Hatcher et al. eds., 20th rev. ed. 2011) (discussing mechanism of action); see also 
Deborah Bartz & Alisa B. Goldberg, Injectable Contraceptives in Contraceptive Technology, in 
CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 209, 210 (Robert A. Hatcher et al. eds., 20th rev. ed. 2011)  (discussing 
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the first instance or whether they sometimes are also effective in 
preventing implantation of a fertilized egg. Although the evidence was not 
always clear, as discussed in what follows, the medical evidence has now 
conclusively established that four of the five contraceptives never act to 
prevent implantation and so never act as abortifacients, even under the 
opponents’ expanded definition of pregnancy and abortion; only one, the 
copper IUD, could sometimes prevent implantation of a fertilized egg if 
inserted after ovulation.270   
The opponents of contraception ignore research finalized in the last 
fifteen years concerning the mechanism of action of EC pills and IUDs.271 
There are two types of dedicated emergency contraceptive pills272 that are 
available for use in the United States: “Plan B One-Step”273 (and its generic 
alternative, Next Choice)274 and “ella.”275 Copper-releasing IUDs can also 
be used as an emergency contraceptive device, though they are primarily 
used as a regular form of birth control.276 A document written in 2006 and 
made public by the Federal Drug Administration stated that Plan B “may 
prevent a fertilized egg from attaching to the womb (implantation).”277 
                                                                                                                          
mechanism of action); Kavita Nanda, Contraceptive Patch and Vaginal Contraceptive Ring, in 
CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 343, 344, 355–56 (Robert A. Hatcher et al. eds., 20th rev. ed. 2011) 
(discussing mechanism of action); Anita L. Nelson & Carrie Cwiak, Combined Oral Contraceptives 
(COCs), in CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 249, 257–58 (Robert A. Hatcher et al. eds., 20th rev. ed. 
2011) (discussing mechanism of action); Elizabeth G. Raymond, Contraceptive Implants in 
Contraceptive Technology, in CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 193, 194–95 (Robert A. Hatcher et al. 
eds., 20th rev. ed. 2011) (discussing mechanism of action); Elizabeth G. Raymond, Progestin-Only 
Pills, in CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY, 237, 237–38 (Robert A. Hatcher et al. eds., 20th rev. ed. 
2011)  (discussing mechanism of action).  
270 This arguably should have an impact on the position of Hobby Lobby Stores and other 
claimants opposing coverage of contraceptives on the basis that they prevent implantation of a 
fertilized egg. If that was truly the basis—and not an objection to all contraceptives or to hormonal 
contraceptives based on the use of a hormone, now that the Emergency Contraceptives Plan B, Ella, 
and the hormonal IUD have been shown to act only by preventing ovulation and not by impacting 
fertilization—then these claimants should agree to cover them. 
271 First, it bears emphasis that none of the various Emergency Contraception options, nor any 
other form of contraception, acts to terminate a pregnancy when pregnancy is defined—as ACOG and 
all other major ob/gyn organizations define it—as occurring after the process of implantation is 
complete. In other words, they cannot abort a pregnancy so defined and, as such, are completely 
different medically from “medical abortion” or “the abortion pill.” See CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY, 
supra note 151 (describing mechanisms of action of all contraceptive medications and devices).  
272 James Trussell & Eleanor Bimla Schwarz, Emergency Contraception, in CONTRACEPTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY 113–45 (Robert A. Hatcher et al. eds., 20th rev. ed. 2011).   
273 Plan B One-Step (a single 1,500 mcg levonorgestrel pill) replaced the previously available 
Plan B (two 750 mcg tablets of levonorgestrel) in 2009. Id. at 113.   
274 A generic version of Plan B was approved in 2009. Id. 
275 A single 30 mg ulipristal pill was approved in 2010 by the Federal Drug Administration. Id. 
276 Id. at 121.   
277 FDA’s Decision Regarding Plan B: Questions and Answers, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/postmarketdrugsafetyinformationforpatientsandproviders/ucm109
795.htm (last updated Mar. 4, 2009) (emphasis added). The entire statement in response to the question 
“How does Plan B work?” reads: “Plan B works like other birth control pills to prevent pregnancy. Plan 
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This document, originally made available during the Bush Administration, 
refers to Plan B as a contraceptive that “prevent[s] pregnancy,” “acts 
primarily by stopping the release of an egg from the ovary (ovulation),” 
and “may prevent the union of sperm and egg (fertilization).”278   
However, the results of a 2012 study of the mechanisms of action of 
the three forms of emergency contraception—Plan B (using the hormone 
levonorgestrel (LNG)), ella (using the hormonal Ulipristal acetate (UPA)), 
and the copper intrauterine device (CU-IUD)—confirm that: (1) Plan B 
and ella both work by delaying or inhibiting ovulation and not by 
inhibiting implantation of a fertilized egg;279 (2) ella’s increased 
effectiveness results from its additional direct inhibitory effect on follicular 
rupture, which allows it to be effective even when administered shortly 
before ovulation,280 a time period when use of Plan B is no longer 
effective; and (3) any effect of ella on the endometrium, the uterine lining, 
was dose dependent.  The effect of the proper dose of ella used for 
Emergency Contraceptive purposes was “similar to that of placebo.”281 The 
study did find that the additional increased effectiveness of the copper IUD 
stems from the additional effect it has on the endometrium.282 Thus, the 
only one of these emergency contraceptive devices that could potentially 
prevent the implantation of a fertilized egg is a copper IUD.   
Because opponents of contraceptives continue to oppose their use even 
when it is clear that they work by preventing conception, rather than by 
preventing a fertilized egg from implanting, the campaign against 
contraceptives is revealed to reflect conflicts reaching far beyond the 
“abortion question,” and the ethics of protection of “human life.” Rather, 
the campaign reflects conflicts concerning the propriety of non-procreative 
sex and particularly the ability of women to express their sexual desire 
without consequences, without fear of pregnancy.283  
                                                                                                                          
B acts primarily by stopping the release of an egg from the ovary (ovulation). It may prevent the union 
of sperm and egg (fertilization). If fertilization does occur, Plan B may prevent a fertilized egg from 
attaching to the womb (implantation). If a fertilized egg is implanted prior to taking Plan B, Plan B will 
not work.” Id. 
278 Id. (emphasis added). 
279 Kristina Gemzell-Danielsson et al., Emergency Contraception—Mechanisms of Action, 87 
CONTRACEPTION 300, 305 (2013). 
280 Id. 
281 Id. at 304. 
282 Id. 
283 Cf. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 10, at 301–02 (noting that a similar conflict 
concerning gender roles, motherhood, and women’s sexuality lurks behind opposition to abortion based 
on a claimed desire to protect potential life).   
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VI.  INCREASED ACCESS TO THE MOST EFFECTIVE CONTRACEPTIVES 
LOWERS THE RATE OF TEEN PREGNANCY,                                       
UNINTENDED PREGNANCIES, AND ABORTIONS 
Finally, I close with a report from the field, which provides the good 
news that removing financial barriers and providing full-options 
counseling about all forms of contraception to a group of sexually active 
women who sought to avoid pregnancy for at least twelve months works to 
reduce the numbers of abortions, teen pregnancy rates, and high risk 
births.284 Public health practitioners report285 that the increasing acceptance 
of IUDs and contraceptive implants, also known as “long acting reversible 
contraceptives,” or “LARCs,” is “fundamentally changing the landscape of 
reproductive health.”286 LARC use is endorsed by the premier 
organizations in the medical field, such as the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American Academy of Pediatrics, as 
well as government and international agencies like the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention and the World Health Organization, because of 
their safety records and extremely low failure rates.287 LARC use is 
considered appropriate both for young women and teenagers who have not 
yet given birth and for older women who have already had children.288 
                                                                                                                          
284 Gina M. Secura et al., Provision of No-Cost, Long-Acting Contraception and Teenage 
Pregnancy, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1316, 1320 (2014). Contraceptive opponents make another claim 
that increasing access to the most effective forms of contraception leads to an increase in unintended 
pregnancy, rather than a decrease, on a population basis because it will increase rates of sexual activity. 
See, e.g., Keith Riler, Editorial, Studies: Birth Control, Contraception Don’t Cut Abortions, LIFENEWS 
(Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.lifenews.com/2012/02/17/studies-birth-control-contraception-dont-cut-
abortions/ (“Studies have shown that contraception increases sexual activity . . . . [a]nd more sex means 
more pregnancies.”). A full response to this claim is outside the scope of this Article. Here, I simply 
point out that the opponents have no evidence to support their claims. Indeed, all the evidence is to the 
contrary; increased access to the most effective contraceptives is having the opposite effect with no 
evidence of a change in the rates of sexual activity. Secura et al., supra, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. at 
1320. 
285 The opposition criticizes case studies establishing the success of programs offering the most 
effective contraceptives at no cost. The opposition repeatedly discounts case studies because they study 
only one population in one geographic area, and are not generalizable. Here, the opposition is 
demonstrating one of the “five misunderstandings about case-study research.” See Bent Flyvbjerg, Five 
Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research, 12 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 219, 221, 224–25 (2006) 
(refuting the claim that “[o]ne cannot generalize on the basis of an individual case; therefore, the case 
study cannot contribute to scientific development”). As Flyvbjerg explains, “it is incorrect to conclude 
that one cannot generalize from a single case. It depends on the case one is speaking of and how it is 
chosen.” Id. at 225. “This applies to the natural sciences as well as to the study of human affairs.” Id. 
Indeed, “[o]ne can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central to 
scientific development via generalization as supplement or alternative to other methods.” Id. at 228 
(emphasis added).    
286 Sue Ricketts et al., Game Change in Colorado: Widespread Use of Long-Acting Reversible 
Contraceptives and Rapid Decline in Births Among Young, Low-Income Women, 46 PERSP. ON SEXUAL 
& REPROD. HEALTH 125, 125 (2014).   
287 Id. 
288 Id.  
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LARCs have lower failure rates than condoms, diaphragms, and other 
hormonal contraceptives like the pill, patch, and ring.289 Their low failure 
rates are influenced by the reduced likelihood, as compared with the pill 
and condoms, that users will use them incorrectly or fail to use them.290  
Despite these advantages, there are substantial barriers to LARC use, 
such as a lack of awareness among consumers and providers about the 
availability, safety, and appropriateness of LARC methods, the time 
required for counseling, and the high initial costs associated with their 
implantation.291 Even Title X clinics—which receive funding to provide a 
broad range of contraceptives to low-income patients, including LARC 
methods, the pill, the patch, and barrier methods such as the diaphragm and 
condoms292—have “historically struggled to meet the demand” for IUDs 
and implants due to “their limited budgets and sliding-fee requirements,” 
and the high upfront costs associated with the implantation of these 
methods.293 Because of their advantages and the need to reduce these 
recognized barriers, a number of pilot projects have been initiated across 
the country to provide increased funding for and education about 
LARCs.294 Studies of these projects show that when women receive 
appropriate counseling regarding both the risks and benefits of 
contraceptives and the appropriateness of different methods of 
contraceptives to each individual, the rates of teenage births, unintended 
pregnancies, and abortions drop dramatically.295  
                                                                                                                          
289 Id. 
290 Id. 
291 See id. (citing Stephanie B. Teal & S. Elizabeth Romer, Awareness of Long-Acting Reversible 
Contraception Among Teens and Young Adults, 52 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S35, S36–S37 (2013) 
(describing the lack of awareness among teens and young adults of the benefits and safety of long-
acting reversible contraception)); see also Nancy A. Dodson et al., Teen Pregnancy Prevention on a 
LARC: An Update on Long-Acting Reversible Contraception for the Primary Care Provider, 24 
CURRENT OPINION IN PEDIATRICS, 439, 442 (2012) (“A study involving telephone surveys and focus 
groups of women aged 18–30 years found low levels of awareness of LARC methods.”); M.L. 
Kavanaugh et al., Long-Acting Reversible Contraception for Adolescents and Young Adults: Patient 
and Provider Perspectives, 26 J. PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT GYNECOLOGY 86, 91–92 (2013) 
(describing cost barriers to initial implantation of LARCs); Secura et al., supra note 284, at 1316, 1317 
(2014) (“Lack of information about effective contraception, limited access, and cost remain barriers to 
use of LARC methods by teens.”).  
292 Ricketts et al., supra note 286, at 126. 
293 Id. 
294 Id.; see Secura et al., supra note 284, at 1317–18 (describing the Contraceptive CHOICE 
Project’s program whereby it provided LARCs to adolescents). 
295 E.g., Ricketts et al., supra note 286, at 129 (“The two-year decline in the proportion of births 
that were high-risk was 24% (a statistically significant decease), and the decline in the number of such 
births was 27%.”); Secura et al., supra note 284, at 1320 (“We found that pregnancy, birth, and 
abortion rates were low among teenage girls and women enrolled in a project that removed financial 
and access barriers to contraception and informed them about the particular efficacy of LARC methods. 
The observed rates of pregnancy, birth, and abortion were substantially lower than national rates among 
all U.S. teens, particularly when compared with sexually experienced U.S. teens.”). 
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For example, the Contraceptive CHOICE Project, a prospective cohort 
study focused on 9,256 girls and women who ranged from fourteen to 
forty-five years old and who lived in the Saint Louis area concluded that 
the rates of pregnancy, birth, and abortion were “substantially lower than 
the national rates” among all U.S. teens, “particularly when compared with 
sexually experienced U.S. teens.”296 Abortion rates from the CHOICE 
cohort were less than half the regional and national rates; the rate of 
teenage birth within the CHOICE cohort was 6.3 per 1,000,297 compared to 
the U.S. rate of 34.4 per 1,000.298 The rates were lower than the national 
rates among different age groups and among both white and black teens.299 
Women and adolescents were eligible for enrollment in the study if they 
had no desire to become pregnant for at least twelve months, were sexually 
active or planning to be sexually active with a male partner, and were 
either not using a contraceptive method or were willing to switch to a new, 
reversible method.300 All women provided written informed consent.301 
Enrollees received standardized counseling regarding commonly used 
reversible methods, which were presented “in order from most to least 
effective, and the potential side effects, risks, and benefits of each method 
were reviewed.”302   
A similar program in Colorado, the Colorado Family Planning 
Initiative, was so successful that it has been described as “game-
chang[ing].”303 In 2009, the Initiative received private funding to initiate a 
program at twenty-eight family planning clinics in counties that contained 
95% of the state’s total population.304 The Initiative was designed to 
address barriers to LARC use by training providers and providing funding 
for LARC methods.305 Although all clients at or below 100% of the federal 
poverty level paid nothing306 regardless of their chosen method, the LARC 
methods and the contraceptive ring were offered to all clients at no cost, 
while all other methods were offered on a sliding-fee scale.307 The study 
reported that between 2009 and 2011, LARC method use among women 
between fifteen and twenty-four years old had grown from below 5% to 
                                                                                                                          
296 Secura et al., supra note 284, at 1317, 1320.   
297 Ricketts et al., supra note 286, at 129 tbl.4.  
298 Secura et al., supra note 284, at 1320 tbl.2. 
299 Id. at 1320. 
300 Id. at 1317. 
301 Id. 
302 Id. The use of standardized counseling and obtaining proper informed consent is of vital 
importance to insure that no women are pressured into using contraception or a specific method of 
contraception.   
303 Ricketts et al., supra note 286, at 131. 
304 Id. at 126. 
305 Id. 
306 Id. 
307 Id. 
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19%.308   
The study showed a significant positive impact on birth rates, abortion 
rates, and high-risk births among teens and young women in the Initiative 
counties as compared to women in the same age cohorts in the non-
Initiative counties.309 First, the birth rate among all fifteen to nineteen-year-
olds in Colorado declined 26% in just two years, between 2009 and 2011 
(from thirty-seven to twenty-eight births per one thousand).310 During the 
same period, the birth rate declined 12% among Colorado women aged 
twenty to twenty-four (from eighty-nine to seventy-eight per one 
thousand).311 Though not all of this decrease was due to LARC use, study 
authors estimated that approximately 75% of the decline of the birth rates 
among these age groups could be attributed to the decline in births among 
low-income women in the CFPI counties.312 Study authors were also able 
to rule out alternative explanations for the drop in fertility rates, such as the 
potential that the rate of sexual activity decreased.313 The Colorado Youth 
Risk Behavior Survey and the state Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System data showed “no significant change . . . in sexual activity among 
high school students,” or among women aged eighteen to twenty-four 
during the study time period.314 
While the rate of abortions for twenty to twenty-four-year-old women 
in the non-CFPI counties remained “essentially stable,”315 with a slight 
increase between 2008 and 2011 (from twenty-six to twenty-eight per one 
thousand),316 the decline in the rate of abortions for twenty to twenty-four-
year-olds in the CFPI group was a stunning 18%.317 There was also an 
extraordinary decline in the rate of abortions for fifteen to nineteen-year-
olds, which occurred both amongst those in the CFPI group and amongst 
those in the non-CFPI group.318 The success of the family planning 
initiative in this instance is reflected in the higher rate of decline for those 
in the CFPI group (34%) than for those in the non-CFPI group (still a 
                                                                                                                          
308 Id. at 128.   
309 See id. at 128–29 (discussing the statistically significant changes which occurred in birth rates, 
high-risk birth rates, and abortion rates). 
310 Id. at 129. 
311 Id.  
312 See id. (“An estimated 77% and 74% of the decline among these age-groups, respectively, can 
be attributed to the decline in births among low-income women in the CFPI counties.”). 
313 Id. at 131.   
314 Id.; see id. at 130 (“Nationally, widespread use of the pill and other hormonal methods has 
contributed to steady declines in fertility rates among young  women in recent decades, but  our 
finding of a rapid increase in LARC use—followed by a marked drop in  fertility that  was  
especially large among  teenagers—constitutes a new phenomenon.” (footnote omitted)). 
315 Id. at 129. 
316 Id. 
317 Id.  
318 Id. 
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significant 29%).319 Finally, the number of high-risk births in CFPI 
counties decreased in two years from a total of 4,052 in 2009 to 2,940 in 
2011, representing a drop of 27%.320 In the non-CFPI counties, the number 
of high-risk births declined from 272 to 233 between 2009 and 2011, a 
decrease of only 14.3%.321   
Another study evaluated the impact of California’s Family Planning, 
Access, Care and Treatment (Family PACT) Program.322 Family PACT 
was initially implemented by the California Legislature in 1997 and 
“received federal financial participation through a Medicaid Family 
Planning expansion waiver program in 2000.”323 “In March 2011, 
California received approval from the Federal Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Service to make Family PACT a State Plan” as allowed by the 
Affordable Care Act, enacted in March 2010.324 
Family PACT, the nation’s largest Medicaid family planning 
expansion program, served more than 1.7 million clients in fiscal year 
2008–09, and reached more women and men than all the other Medicaid 
“waiver programs” combined.325 “Family PACT provides reproductive 
health and family planning services, including all U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration-approved contraceptive methods, to eligible uninsured 
clients who are at or below 200% of the federal poverty level.”326 Study 
authors estimated that 286,700 unintended pregnancies were averted by 
Family PACT services; 207,500 were avoided by adults (aged twenty to 
forty-four years old) and almost 79,200 were avoided by adolescents (aged 
fifteen to nineteen years old).327 “[T]he unintended pregnancies that were 
prevented would have resulted in almost 120,000 abortions.”328 These 
estimates were arrived at by adopting “conservative assumptions about 
contraceptive use within the program and failure rates to avoid 
overestimating the fertility effect of the program.”329 
Finally, a recent related study found declines in abortion following 
                                                                                                                          
319 Id. 
320 Id.  
321 Id. 
322 See generally Diana G. Foster et al., Estimating the Fertility Effect of Expansions of Publicly 
Funded Family Planning Services in California, 21 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 418, 418–24 (2011) 
(reporting the methodology and results of a study that observed the number of prevented unintended 
pregnancies accomplished by California’s Family PACT program and, therefore, the program’s 
impact).   
323 Id. at 418. 
324 Id. 
325 Id. 
326 Id. 
327 Id. at 422 tbl.5.   
328 Id. at 423.   
329 Id. 
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increases in LARC use in Iowa.330 By assessing changes in LARC use and 
subsequent abortion while controlling for initial LARC use, the study was 
“able to remove region-level confounding, isolate the effect of LARC use 
on abortion and establish a clear temporal relationship between LARC and 
abortion.”331 Despite an increase in access to abortions in Iowa, the number 
of resident abortions decreased from 5,198 to 3,887 (8.7 per 1000 women 
aged 15 to 44 years old to 6.7 per 1,000 women in the same age group).332 
Controlling for percentages of women living below the poverty line, 
population density, and the increased availability of abortions, the authors 
found a “significant longitudinal association between increases in LARC 
use and the subsequent declines in abortion across Iowa regions.”333 The 
study’s authors state that their estimates suggest that a small increase of “1 
LARC user per 100 women in a given region was associated with a 4% 
reduction in the odds of abortion for women living in that region.”334   
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Underlying the opposition to contraception today, opposition framed in 
woman-protective terms, lies an aversion to sex for pleasure, sex 
undertaken for reasons other than procreation. This opposition to non-
procreative sex is remarkably regressive, extends to sex for pleasure within 
marriage, and unites the opposition against reproductive rights and same-
sex marriage. To counteract the forces opposing broad contraceptive 
access, we must examine the reasoning behind the opposition, look with 
skepticism at reasons that appeal to science and abortion bias, and demand 
that our decision-making bodies do the same.  
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